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ABSTRACT
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Directed by: Professor Jean Elshtain
In recent years, positivistic social science has
come under sustained attack. Almost all of the weaknesses
of which it is accused flow from the fact that positivism
cannot conceptualize matters of human consciousness. Hence
it has no theoretical access to intersubjective meanings
and rules, individual intentions and beliefs, large-scale
conceptual innovations, the transformations in practice
which accompany them, and troublesome contradictions in the
ways in which human actors understand their own activity.
For critics who believe this flaw to be fatal, the
pressing task becomes the search for a nev; method of ex-
ploring and explaining social life. And in the annals of
social history, there is perhaps no more radical, compre-
hensive and perfected candidate than Hegelian idealism.
Hegel offers both a devastating critique of positive science
V
and a competing theory of scientific explanation, in which
consciousness plays the central role. He constructs an ac-
count of the individual subject as intentional agent, who
engages in a series of internal relations with the objec-
tive world; of social life as expressive of shared norms
and meanings which in turn provide the content of the indi-
vidual's thought; of qualitative transformations which mark
conceptual and practical history; and of a fundamental dis-
tinction between the appearance of human action and its
always rational reality. In his own way, Hegel anticipates
(and in far more systematic form) many of the principles
of two important contemporary challengers to positivism:
interpretive and critical theory.
Hegel's social theory, however, rests upon the claim
that an objective Reason is the inner substance of all
things and the ultimate subject of all relations. To most
contemporary thinkers, this claim is unacceptable. To
Marx, Hegel's eminent successor, it was unacceptable also.
Marx's power as a social theorist stems in part from the
fact that he breaks with idealist ontology. He locates
thought as an attribute of human beings alone and the con-
tent of thought as generated solely from within human
practice. This done, Marx incorporates the strengths of
Hegelian analysis in his own account of purposive labor,
vi
the social totality, historical transformations, and the
distinction between the appearance of human action and,
for Marx, its less than rational reality. However, Marx's
relation to Ilegel is not one of simple theoretical pro-
gression. On the one hand, he preserves certain Hegelian
principles highly problematic for any materialist: the
idea of a teleological history, and the idea (this the
great strength as well as the great weakness of Marx's ma-
ture method) of an abstract logic which determines concrete
practice. On the other hand, he parts company with Hegel
just where he should not. Hegel appreciates the irreduci-
ble complexity of social life because he sees the special
reason which inheres in each particular kind of practice--
from labor to politics to philosophy. Marx at his worst
explains all forms of practice as disguised expressions of
a single one. To do this is not only to miss the points
of most human activities, but also to denigrate the self-
understanding of the actors involved in them.
The search for a method of social explanation, then,
cannot come to an end with either Hegel or Marx. And it
is not that one simply needs to resolve the tensions in
the latter 's methodological relation to the former. Both
theorists are committed rationalists. Their intellectual
and political descendents must decide how far to follow
vii
them in their belief that human action can and will become
fully rational, and social life completely transparent to
its participants
.
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INTRODUCTION
1
Science can be said to be in some sense a search
for truth. Of course, everything hinges on "in what
sense." Certainly, few contemporary philosophers of
science would agree with Aristotle that the most basic sci-
ence of all is "theology" or metaphysics
, the "theory of
first principles and reasons," of "being as being." in-
deed, modern science became modern precisely by detaching
itself from speculative metaphysics, and by restricting
first the search, and then the concept of truth, to the
realm of observable entities.
The fact that science no longer addresses metaphy-
sical issues, however, does not mean that it has left first
principles behind. Every empirical exploration of things
in the world rests on a prior if tacit understanding of
what constitutes a "thing," of what things constitute the
world, and of how the world normally runs. The many ex-
planatory theories which have come and gone in the past
four centuries have taken with them different notions of
natural order, basic units of analysis, dimensions of var-
iation, and evidential support.^ Every explanatory theory,
in turn, rests on a more fundamental vision of the rela-
tionship between reality and the mind which seeks to know
it. Since the 17th century, most scientists have under-
2
stood this relationship in very much the same way. They
have shared the assumption that the real world and the
ideas people have about it are entirely separable. The
world is simply what it is, and the scientist's task is to
come to grips with it, without the obfuscations of mental
structures, ontologies, or, curiously enough, conceptuali-
zations. "Our concepts may be open-textured, but the world
is not. If language is to be descriptive, it must indi-
cate what there is in the world, no matter how variably we
5talk about it." "What there is" on its part are indivi-
dual, physical units, ^ which are either directly observ-
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able or can be inferred from observable phenomena. Hence,
although the mind does not participate in the construction
of reality, it has access to the latter through the process
of sensory investigation. Lastly, there is a comprehen-
sible order to the world, and this order is a function of
purely external, natural relations which consistently hold
between things of the same sort. The mind can explain sen-
sible phenomena to the extent that it penetrates the uni-
versal laws which govern them— laws for which, in return,
individual empirical cases provide evidence, but never
proof
.
If modern science can be said to be, in this
sense, a search for truth, modern social science has been
in the same sense a search for the truth of social life.
Mainstream social scientists have discerned a close like-
ness between social and natural explanation. They believe
the social world to be reducible to empirically observ-
able facts or bits of human behavior. They see sensory
perception as the only legitimate foundation of scientific
knowledge, and conversely, scientific concepts as repli-
cations in thought of sense-data or of that which is in-
ferrable from them. Finally, they find an order in social
life which derives from regular relations between behavior
and variables external to it. Their long-range goal is
gthe discovery of general lav/s of human behavior, which
would allow them to explain individual cases in the past
and present, and predict individual cases in the future,
given the occurrence of specified initial conditions.
These laws purportedly do not describe generalizations
which may hold true for limited periods of time, but ra-
ther describe regular, unchanging relations between in-
finitely repeatable phenomena.
As much recent literature in philosophy attests,
there are innumerable problems with applying natural sci-
ence methods to the study of society. Most fundamentally,
empirical observation cannot grasp the internal meanings
which make a particular piece of "behavior" what it is.
These meanings include, for example, the individual actor's
beliefs and purposes which make the bowing of the head an
5act of prayer rather than a sign of consent; and the in-
tersubjective rules which assure that a bowing of the head
will be either an act of prayer or a sign of consent, but
not a move of defiance. Because the identity of an action
in part depends upon the particular rules, beliefs and
purposes which inform it, the concepts which are to cap-
ture action must include a reference to ideas and not sim-
ply to sense-data. And because social life is full of
conflicts in which actors differ over the meaning and iden-
tity of their own actions and the actions of others around
them, the concepts with which the scientist describes a
given set of actions will be neutral only in trivial cases.
Most of the time, as, for example, when she must decide
whether the actions she is studying count as an instance
of a riot or a rebellion, the scientist enters into the
same arena in which actors themselves dispute the meaning
of their practices.'''^ The decision she makes will place
her on one side of the dispute rather than the other. In
sum, the social theorist must take into her account of ac-
tion the self-interpretations of its participants, and
must describe that action in a way which will implicate
her in their political affairs. Hence no sharp line can
be drawn between her conceptual activity and the world she
investigates
.
If action, secondly, is expressive of rules, be-
liefs and purposes, the scientist cannot look solely to
external causes for its explanation. A search for univer-
sal causal laws of human behavior is also inapt. This is
so not only because an explanation of action must make re-
ference to meanings as well as causes, but also because
the meanings which inform action in one social whole are
unlikely to characterize action in another. The human ca-
pacity for conceptual innovation and imagination means that
even physical movements which look the same in two differ-
ent cultures or historical epochs, may not be instances of
the same thing. If the meanings which inform action change
over time and space, one cannot articulate universal laws
of social life.
Finally, empirical science cannot appreciate dis-
tinctions between the appearance and reality of action to
which ambiguities in intentionali ty give rise. The almost
infinite number of ways in which social rules may be tied
to bodily movements, means that movements which appear to
a "foreign" observer to be an instance of one kind of ac-
tion may be in reality an instance of another. The possi-
bility of dissemblance in human affairs, means that an in-
dividual actor's behavior nay conceal rather than express
her real beliefs and purposes. But the most significant
kind of appearance/reality split arises from a contradic-
tion between what an actor intends and believes herself to
7be doing, and what she in truth is doing. If empirical
theory cannot grasp this split because it does not speak
the language of intentionali ty in the first place, the
theorist who only speaks this language cannot grasp it
either
.
If one looks back over the history of Western
thought, one can find a second kind of search for truth,
v/ith its own conception of and claims to scientific vali-
dity. The philosophy of idealism, which places mind at
the center of all explanation, has a long and tenacious
tradition with its roots in ancient Greece. The classical
Greek idealists believed that thought had at least as ob-
jective a reality as matter. They found the truth of every
particular, sensible thing to be the idea or universal of
which it was either a copy or an embodiment. According to
the immanentists , this universal determined not only the
identity but the development of each thing, so that cau-
sality was not an external relation of one discrete vari-
able to another, but an internal relation of a thing at
some stage in its development to the idea of it as a per-
fected being. Because the explanation of things lay in
ideas (whether immanent in or transcendent to them) , and
because each species had its own unique idea which made it
what it was, every level of being was thought to be self-
8explanatory and its principle of explanation irreducible
to the principle of any lower level. The rational hier-
archy of all sensible entities gave to the universe its
natural order. Greek idealism obviously could not, and
did not, equate scientific knowledge with sense perception.
Some theorists dismissed the evidence of the senses alto-
gether, and purported to re-direct the gaze of the mind
from the imperfections of the phenomenal world to the im-
mutable realm of pure thought. Others believed that the
scientist must observe sensible phenomena because ideas
did not exist apart from them, but that the true objects
of knowledge still were the ideas and not particular ex-
istents. If the scientist had to study sensible things in
order to discover the ideas which informed them, he also
had to have prior conceptual knowledge in order to recog-
nize the thing as this kind of thing and not some other.
The Greeks, luckily, had no misgivings about the unlimited
capacities of the human mind."^"*" They believed that reason
itself was the unique end of human beings, and (with what
Hegel later called the "characteristic naivete of the an-
cients") assumed that this was enough to guarantee them
the ability to fathom the rest of the universe. It fol-
lows from their notion of the natural end of human life,
by the way, that they would explain action not in terms of
external causes, but in terms of its inner rationality
or lack of it. Such an explanation at once became an ethi-
cal assessment of the actor. To act according to one's
proper place in a justly ordered community, or to act on
the basis of a true knowledge of things, was to live in
harmony with one's highest nature, and hence to live vir-
tuously and well.
With the rise of Christianity in the Mediterranean
world, this highly intellectualized form of idealism under-
went a great change. Catholic thinkers followed Greek ra-
tionalists in attributing to the sensible world an ideal
truth. But they found the difference between the world
and its truth to be that not between matter and thought,
but between matter and spirit. The theological reading of
"Mind" as an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient God
made the world newly significant, and human agency and
reason, newly problematic. God became the original cause
of every level of being, from the purely material to the
purely spiritual. His divine plan became the final telos
of every particular being and of the universe as a whole,
which consequently had a meaning beyond its physical ap-
pearance.''"^ In God's will rested the explanation not only
of every natural event, but of every human action. At the
same time, humans (v/ho experienced the mind/matter dis-
tinction as the troublesome conflict between spirit and
flesh) bore responsibility for what they did, and their
10
works ultimately were to be judged by an absolute Being
with the power to bestow eternal punishments and rewards.
Consequently, the explanation of action, which for the
Greeks had evoked ethical questions about the actor's
ability to live a life of excellence, raised for Catho-
lics a question with far more serious implications: did
that act manifest goodness or corruption on the part of
its human agent? Finally, Christian idealism undercut
the ancients' belief in the innate nobility and power of
the human intellect. Late medieval theorists, who were of
Aristotelian temper, declared that humans enjoyed a na-
tural reason, and the world a natural order. Through the
exercise of this reason, humans could abstract from ob-
servable phenomena to a knowledge of immutable essences,
and could even gain an imperfect knowledge of God, who was
demonstrated through His creations. But still, like every-
thing else, the human mind owed its powers to God, and
these powers were subordinate to His powers. Most impor-
tant, human reason provided no access to the ultimate re-
ality of God and hence of life on earth. Faith and reve-
lation alone did so.
With the birth of modern science in the 16th and
17th centuries, an elaborate synthesis of Catholic spir-
itualism and Aristotelian rationalism, gave way to a me-
chanical theory of the universe. The explanation of all
11
sensible things in terms of a hierarchy of natural ideas
and the purpose and will of an interventionist God, was
replaced by an explanation in terms of a single set of laws
describing regular relations in time and space between
bodies reducible to physical atoms. The new mechanistic
cosmology presupposed
the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter,
or material, spread throughout space in a flux
of configurations. In itself such a material is
senseless, valueless, purposeless. It just does
what it does do, following a fixed routine imposed
by external relations which do not spring from the
nature of its being. 13
At first, the theory of the material universe as "a per-
14feet" piece of mechanism" incorporated a dualistic ac-
count of mind and matter. It made mind as Spirit or God
the creator of the laws of motion, and mind as human rea-
son the depository for sensations, ideas, and "everything
15
refractory to exact mathematical handling." It was the
task of God to turn on the clockwork of the material world.
It was the task of human reason to accumulate knowledge of
that world, calculate its pleasures and its pains, and
serve the human passions instead of restraining them. The
logic of mechanism, however, could and eventually did lead
to a fully materialist and reductionist vision of reality,
which took material regularities as given, without ascrib-
ing them to a spiritual first cause; and which explained
the human mind entirely in terms of its simplest material
12
components
.
The resurgence of idealism in late 18th and early
19th century Germany, took place against a backdrop of
continuing triumphs in the positive sciences. Idealism
hence assumed a newly defensive posture. As Hegel re-
marked (but utterly without regret) , it no longer was pos-
sible simply to presume an inner reason of all things and
an infinite power of the human intellect. One instead had
to make two difficult theoretical moves in order to sal-
vage the primacy of mind from the blows already dealt it
by the scientific revolution, and from the threat of new
blows yet to come. One had to acknowledge and account for
the undeniable advances of positive science, and undermine
the mechanistic premises on which these advances were pre-
dicated. The Kantian resolution of this dilemma was a re-
latively modest one: it granted to human thought a special
dispensation from the nexus of physical causes and effects.
It claimed that the mind was not a passive recipient of
sense-data, but actively participated in the construction
of all experience. It also reserved a unique status for
actions expressive of moral reason, in a world otherwise
governed by natural laws. The unfortunate by-product of
this strategy was that it created two schisms in idealist
theory where none had existed before. The first was be-
tween experience and reality--between the world as the
13
mind ordered it and the world as it "really was," to which
the mind had no access. The second schism was between na-
ture and reason—between action determined by natural de-
sires and causes, and action determined by moral purposes
and ideals. Partly in response to these problems in Kant-
ian theory, the absolute idealists set out to make a far
more ambitious case on reason's behalf. They asserted that
subjective reason and objective reality were distinctions
created by and internal to an abstract Ego (Fichte) or
Mind (Hegel). The findings of empirical science were le-
gitimate but partial truths, which pertained to the sub-
ject's experience of the object as alien to itself. The
understanding of the world as a purely physical one go-
verned by natural impulses and material forces, was symp-
tomatic of a reason not yet conscious of nature and objec-
tivity as its own " self-distinctions , " ruled by its own
logic.
While Hegel was not the first of the absolute
idealists, he was by far the most presumptuous. His was a
grand attempt to prove on strict logical grounds that na-
ture, history, and the subject/object distinction were
manifestations of a self-devloping Reason. This attempt
in the end was a failure. But the analytic complexity
which the onslaughts of modern science forced upon him,
and his remarkable breadth of vision, make Hegel provoca-
14
tive— not to say seductive-- for contemporary social theor-
ists. He offers, first of all, a richly textured portrait
of the human subject. He sees the layers of the inner
self as deposits of the various relations the subject has
to the objective world. Each of these relations is in-
herently purposive and cannot be reduced to simple physi-
cal terms. Second, Hegel constructs an interpretive and
wholistic account of social life. He explains every cul-
ture with reference to a unique rationality or "spirit,"
which provides the inner thread and outer coherence of its
economic, religious, political and intellectual practices.
Third, he develops a method which enables him at once to
respect and comprehend the qualitative transformations of
which history is made. Finally, Hegel penetrates beneath
the particular intentions and meanings which inform human
action, to a reality of which actors are unaware. This is
the reality of a universal Reason. Hegel's reference to it
allows him to escape the hermeneutical circle which every
culture creates for itself, and the limitations adhering
to every particular mode of thought and practice.
It is precisely the idea of an objective Reason
which Marx rejects when he conducts his own social inves-
tigations. His repudiation of absolute idealism has im-
mense consequences for his social theory, in the same way
that the repudiation of Aristotelian metaphysics had im-
15
mense consequences for the post-medieval understanding of
the natural world. Nevertheless, Marx draws not on posi-
tivistic science but on Hegel, in order to analyze his-
tory, social life, and capital. Does he, then, succeed in
devising a non-idealist method wich yet preserves the
strengths of Hegelian inquiry? Certainly Marx does recon-
struct in accordance with materialist premises, Hegel's
notion of the subject as constituted by its purposive re-
lations to the world; of an inner thread which binds eco-
nomic, religious, political and intellectual practices into
a coherent whole; of the transformative nature of society;
and of the distinction between action as it appears to its
human authors, and a hidden reality of action. With his
new theoretical vision, Marx makes a set of discoveries de-
nied him by either idealism or empiricism. There are,
however, several curious aspects of Marx's relation to
Hegel. First, he fails to make as decisive a break with
absolute idealism as he believes himself to be making. In
speaking of history as if it moves through a series of ne-
gations towards a final, rational climax, he unwittingly
suggests that abstractions have ends of their own. And
when he argues in his most powerful work, that an objective
logic determines the course of the capital-wage labor rela-
tion, he comes very close to explaining concrete social
life in terms of an abstract Idea. Second, Marx chooses
16
to part company with Hegel at an unfortunate point. Like
the idealist philosopher, he attaches great significance
and promise to human consciousness. Yet he gives only a
truncated, ambiguous account of it, and at times he seems
to deny that humans are able to have even some grasp of
what they are doing. Here he would have done better to
learn from Hegel, who always appreciates the rationality
—
however partial and contradictory--in every mode of human
thought and practice.
When all is said and done, absolute idealism is
spun out of the stuff of fantasy, and Marx's materialism
is not. With this point in his favor, it is Marx and not
Hegel who bequeaths to us the more compelling (although
hardly unproblematic) explanation of social life. Still,
modern theorists in search of a method will find a study o
the two men more illuminating than a study of the one.
This is true both because Hegel's influence on Marx is
profound, and because in a critical sense it is not pro-
found enough.
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PART I: HEGEL
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A great distance separates Absolute Idealism from
analytic philosophy, although it is a distance foreshort-
ened by the common heritage of Hume and Kant. Positivists
simply dismiss Hegel, whose metaphysic seems a stranga fan-
tasy—hard to swallow even if it could be taken as mere
theology, which it cannot. Recently, however, certain
ordinary language theorists have resuscitated Hegel but
without his metaphysic, for in other ways they found his
work highly compatible with their own. Precisely because
of the real bonds they share with him, it is imperative to
keep sight of where these bonds do not extend. Quite in
contrast to contemporary interpretive theory, Hegel stepped
through a critique of empiricism and its Kantian rejoinder,
to a conception of the world in which the explanation of
the meanings and beliefs which characterize a particular
form of social life, lies in the activity of a Universal
Reason.
Perhaps nothing symbolizes the difference between
Hegel and analytic theorists in general, as nicely as their
disparate use of language. Hegel brought a tradition of
intellectual obscurantism to its finest if not its last
hour. Is this obscurantism necessary to his argument, and
must one replicate it if one wants to do that argument jus-
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tice? It is fairly obvious, first of all, that Hegel could
have avoided many of his forays into verbal darkness; and
second that these forays tend to make a mystery of the di-
alectical transitions which must sustain his system as a
whole. But the theory of Absolute Idealism does require a
very abstract discourse, for its central point is that the
truth of concrete, phenomenal things lies in the universal
ideas they express, while the familiar, down-to-earth de-
tails of their transient existence, the philosopher can
and must ignore.
Except with regard to his prose, reading Hegel is
like visiting a hall of mirrors, where each surface reveals
the entire room. The reflection of the whole in the parts
is indeed one of the choicest points of the dialectical
method and prohibits a merely piecemeal discussion of
Hegel's work. While respecting, as one must do, the inter-
nal relations he posits between reason, the physical world,
and social life, I will avoid taking another of those in-
valuable but essentially return journeys through the Phe-
nomenology, Logic, Philosophies of Nature and Spirit. In-
stead, I wish to clarify a limited number of issues bear-
ing on the question of what constitutes a science of so-
ciety: specifically, Hegel's conception of the human sub-
ject, his theory of knowledge, and his method of scientific
explanation
.
CHAPTERI
THE THEORY OF THE SUBJECT
Hegel is perhaps the greatest of all rationalists.
He finds human reason fully adequate to the task of com-
prehending reality. He also believes that social rela-
tions and institutions embody the reason inherent in a par-
ticular form of life. Many other social theorists, of
course, share one or the other of these beliefs with him.
More singularly, he asserts that a reason ontologically
prior to human consciousness and its social world, is the
inner substance and determinant of all things. A univer-
sal reason constitutes those natural objects which appear
to be purely material. It expresses itself in those ac-
tions of human subjects which appear to be a function of
external causes, irrational passions, or solely individual
intentions and purposes. Lastly, it determines the course
of what appears to be an indifferent historical process,
in which nations and peoples develop and decay. It is
Hegel's purpose in all his theoretical labors, including
his theory of society, to show how that which confronts the
thinking subject as the most intractably alien object, is
in truth a manifestation of thought, so that the apparent-
ly constricting, external relations in which the subject
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finds itself, are internal relations in which it is really
"at home."-'-
However, Hegel could not, after Hume, assert with
the naive assurance of the Greeks, that thought is the in-
ner substance of things. Neither could he assume, after
Kant, that the human mind can know this to be the case.
He had to argue these points, and argue conclusively,
which, since he could not rest his case on the evidence of
the senses, meant that he had to argue deductively. Fur-
ther, he had to argue consistently, deriving matter from
thought instead of leaving a material substratum unex-
plained. Hegel's solution to the problem of post-Kantian
idealism was elegant if not unmarred. By means of a pe-
culiar kind of deduction he called the dialectic, he drew
out of the necessary but most innocuous, empty, and seem-
ingly formal category of human thought, "Being," a series
of more and more elaborated or "concrete" categories, each
of which encompassed but surpassed its predecessors in its
richness and capacity to enfold the content of thought.
Thus Hegel claimed to give logical necessity to the cate-
gories of pure reason which in Kantian philosophy had only
a pragmatic rationale. But second, Hegel's deduction of
the categories—or, as he saw it, their self-deduction
("These thought types must be deduced out of Thought it-
self ... we have merely to let the thought-forms follow
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the impulse of their own organic life"^)
—carried itself
beyond purely formal constructs of the subjective mind to
be applied to an externally given content, to categories
which progressively implied the determination of their own
content. In other words, these were categories of reason
the meaning of which entailed thought's giving itself its
determinations rather than being dependent for its content
upon non-thought. Their advent signified the conversion
of reason to Reason, the transformation of mere thought-
form into form-creating-content . The implications of such
a transformation were as radical as the explanation and
disintegration of the subject-object dichotomy which had
plagued philosophy since Descartes, and as heady as the
assurance of the fundamental freedom of subjectivity, which
had been in peril since Newton. That self -ob jecti fying
Reason was the logical telos of the subjective categories,
moreover, implied the inherent capability of the human mind
to grasp the real nature of the objective world. For the
categories, which led of their own accord to the self-
determining Idea, "are nothing but our own thought and its
familiar forms or terms: and these are the ABC. . .of
3
everything else."
It is vital to understand precisely what Hegel
means by "Abstract Thought," because he will claim this
Thought to be the inner logic of every concrete thing, in-
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eluding the things of the social world, and of almost all
relations between things, including social relations. He-
gel describes Abstract Thought (which he also calls the
"Concept," "Idea," "Notion," and "Reason") as an "immedi-
ate" or undifferentiated conceptual whole, which proceeds
to create all of its distinctions or content out of itself.
These distinctions are the formal categories of thought
such as "Being" and "Nothing," "Identity" and "Difference,"
"Form" and "Content," "Cause" and "Effect," and most cri-
tically, "Subject" and "Object." Because Thought is self-
determining, the process by which it creates its own con-
tent cannot be accidental, instinctual, or the effect of a
material cause. It rather must be a " self-deductive " pro-
cess, in which each necessary category of Thought gives way
through internal contradiction to an equally necessary,
but more elaborated or "concrete" category. Through this
self-deduction of the categories, what was merely implicit
in the nature of Reason becomes explicit. Because its de-
velopment is determined by its unfolding inner nature and
not by a contingent, external cause, Hegel equates the
Idea with both necessity and freedom. Because the Idea
never comes up against a barrier dividing it from a re-
ality independent of it, Hegel calls it "Infinite Thought."
One important consequence of the fact that Thought has no
limits, is that it steps beyond the production of its own
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content, to produce the thought of this content as its own
creation. That is, the Idea not only "separates itself
from itself" by elaborating its own distinctions, but it
returns to itself as the self
-concious unity of "identity
and difference," "thought and content," "subject and ob-
ject." This return is implicit in the entire elaboration
of the categories leading up to it. It occurs as the con-
tradictions internal to each category force Thought to po-
sit more and more comprehensive categories, which come
closer and closer to articulating the system of Thought as
a self-reflective whole. There is, however, one final dis-
tinction which Abstract Thought makes: that betv/een Thought
as a purely formal, conceptual whole (including the con-
ceptual distinction between form and content, subject and
object) and the actual objective world as its concrete con-
tent. This juncture bears the entire weight of Hegel's
derivation of the concrete world from Abstract Thought.
He argues that the very distinction between Thought as a
conceptual whole and objectivity entails that the object
become actual. His reason: if the object did not become ac-
tual, it would remain mere concept, and the distinction be-
tween Concept and objectivity would have yet to be made. It
is here, then, that the Idea "breaks through its own bar-
4
riers and opens out into objectivity," and Hegel moves
from an account of the Abstract Logic to an account of na-
ture and human civilization.
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By the end of his discussion of the Abstract Idea,
Hegel has established certain explanatory principles which
will govern his study of social life. The most obvious
principle is that phenomenal reality--physical nature, hu-
man subjects, and social institutions— is a "covering under
which the Notion lies concealed." The concrete world is
Reason in objective form, and hence the purpose of Hegel's
social investigations will be "to apprehend in the show of
the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent
and the eternal which is present."^ He will discover in
the objects of both Nature and Society (which he calls
"Mind" or "Spirit"), specific natural and spiritual ideas,
and he v/ill explain nature and society in terms of them.
These ideas, and the actual objects in which they manifest
themselves, comprise the objective content or distinctions
of Abstract Thought.
. . . the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy
of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an ap-
plied Logic, and that Logic is the soul which
animates them both. Their problem in that case is
only to recognize the logical forms under the
shapes they assume in Nature and Mind—shapes
which are only a particular mode of expression
for the forms of pure thought.
One must note that the relation of natural ideas to na-
tural objects is not symmetrical with the relation of
spiritual ideas to concrete social life. Ideas of nature
are immanent in sensuous natural objects, but these ob-
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jects do not "have" their ideas in the sense of being con-
scious of them. The idea of an oak, to use an old example,
develops from "implicit inwardness" to explicit actuality
as the acorn grows into the tree, but the oak never knows
itself or, for that matter, any thing else. For this rea-
son Hegel calls sensuous nature "Mind asleep." Ideas of
spirit, on the other hand, are immanent in the thought and
thought-permeated practices of conscious, self -reflective
human beings. The idea of freedom, for example, becomes
actual only when human beings become fully conscious of it
and embody it in their practice. But although the ideas
of spirit have no actuality outside human thought and prac-
tice, these ideas still are expressions of Universal Rea-
son rather than simply the peculiar, imaginative inventions
of individual persons or cultures. It follows, rather
oddly, that the particular content of a spiritual idea (the
distinction of the concept of Right, for example, into Ab-
stract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life) is determined by
neither the empirical content of human practice nor the
analytic vagaries of the philosopher. The concept develops
its distinctions out of itself and expresses itself in,
rather than corresponds to or arises out of, a given em-
pirical and interpretive social reality.
Hegel's second explanatory principle, it that the
concrete world is hierarchically ordered according to the
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extent to v;hich each level of existence is able to think
and reflect on itself. The realm of human civilization or
Spirit is of a higher order than that of pure material na-
ture, because human subjects have the capacity for con-
sciousness and self-consciousness. Hegel's understanding
of self-consciousness is highly complex, because he sees
the self as something not separate from, but rather inclu-
sive of, its objective relations. Thus when he asks. To
what extent does the subject have a knowledge of itself?
he asks it in this form: How does the subject understand
itself in its relation to the object or "other," and how
does the subject attempt to overcome the separation between
this other and itself? Hegel will show the subject to be
multi-layered, in that it is engaged with the object as
raw nature, as a second subject, as a labored product, as
the spiritual world, and finally as a concept in thought.
He will argue that each of these engagements arises logi-
cally (not temporally) out of a lower mode, each undergoes
its own development over historical time, and each embodies
a greater unity of subject and object than the relations
below it. These ontological relations, which determine
the being of the subject, are at the same time epistemo-
logical relations, for two reasons. First, each way in
which the subject interacts with the object is a means to
self-consciousness, for all aabject/object relations are
attempts to wrench from the other an expression and a know-
ledge of the self. Second, the highest subject/object re-
lation, which enfolds the rest, is the epis temological re-
lation itself. Here the activity of mind transmutes the
external world, and all other relations with it, into a
set of ideas. In the internality of philosophical thought,
where the object appears as pure concept stripped of its
o
phenomenal covering, one "meets v/ith oneself." The com-
plete identity of subject and object, and conversely the
utter freedom of the former from the limitations of the
latter which philosophical thought entails, is the telos
of human subjectivity. For "It is the urge, the impulse
of spiritual life in itself, to break through the hull of
nature, of sensuousness , of its own self-alienation , and
to attain the light of consciousness, namely, its own
self."^ It also is the ultimate stage of the Idea, for
the human subject who thinks philosophically, embodies the
Idea as the self-conscious unity of subject and object.
One must not under-estimate the significance of the
third principle of social explanation: that necessity go-
verns the movement of social life. This follows from the
twin claims that Abstract Thought develops its content in
a thoroughly necessary way, and that the concrete world is
the expression of this development. Thus, when Hegel ex-
amines the transience of nations, the confusing sequence of
32
artistic genres or religious movements, actions which seem
to be purely impulsive or simply brutal, he will do so in
order to show hov/ they manifest the necessary workings of
Reason. He makes one concession to irrationality: he ad-
mits that a small element of chance enters into human af-
fairs. But since chance is, by definition, meaningless,
it plays no part in an explanation of the reason why
things occur as they do. Ironically, Hegel insists that
what happens in the realm of spirit happens of necessity,
in order to protect the freedom of the subject. He be-
lieves that to act according to whim, instinct, idiosyn-
cratic intention, or in response to the stimulus of an ex-
ternal force, is to be determined by something other than
reason and hence to be unfree. For Hegel, only rational
action is self-determined action, aid reason—determined by
its own inner nature--cannot be other than it is. In his
stress on the necessity which governs human action, Hegel
shows a limited sympathy with positivistic science, which
aims to reveal the explanatory laws beneath the complex
texture of social practice. But Hegel believes that the
positivists err profoundly when they articulate these laws
as blind and contingent relations between external causes
and effects, instead of as logically necessary relations
grounded in the inner reason of all things. Even (or es-
pecially) the gap between the non-rational appearance of
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social life and its rational reality, is not fortuitous,
but is a necessary stage in the odyssey of the Idea.
"Man alone has f reedom---and only because he
thinks.""'"^ At his beginnings, however--and by "beginnings"
Hegel means both the earliest point in historical time and
the most primitive level of subjective experience—he is
only potentially free. In fact he lives at the mercy of
forces beyond his control. He is hedged in by natural in-
stinct on the one side and natural obstruction on the
other. He acts out of sensual impulse and brute emotion.
The fundamental task he must undertake in order to realize
his freedom is this: he must transform his natural desires
and the natural objects around him into aims and objects of
his own making. Hegel insists against liberal theorists,
that this transformation cannot occur outside of social
life. He insists against conservatives, that the replace-
ment of natural by social relations marks the demise of
instinctual behavior and the eventual triumph of rational
action. Through the reciprocal satisfaction of natural
needs, humans develop new, specifically social needs which
combine natural with "mental needs arising from ideas.
These "mental needs"--for recognition, autonomy, community,
justice, knowledge, and freedom itself—bear the promise
of the subject's liberation from the confines of physical
nature. They will issue in the elaboration of a second
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level of existence: an inter-subjective, thought-
constituted or "spiritual" realm of language, custom, mo-
ral rules, laws, norms of beauty, religious practices, and
modes of knowledge, which both nourish and reflect in ob-
jective form the subject's developing reason.
Free Mind consists precisely in its being no
longer implicit or as concept alone, but in its
transcending . . . its immediate natural exist-
ence, until the existence which it gives to it-
self is one which is solely its own and free.-^^
The most rudimentary engagement of the human sub-
ject with the object, however, is that between human being
as desirous animal and natural world as pure, sensuous
"other." Here the subject experiences the object as en-
tirely external and alien to him. He can free himself
from this object only by destroying it. Driven by instinc-
tual desire, the subject consumes the natural object and
so dissolves the self/other distinction. Such is the
idealist's interpretation of natural appetite! The gra-
tification of brute desire, hov/ever, is a poor means to a
freedom of the self from the other, because it presupposes
the independence of the object. It also is a poor means
to a knowledge of the self in the other, because it anni-
hilates the other altogether. Finally, it bespeaks an im-
poverished subject, beacuse it does not require the media-
tion of reason and is the one mode of engagement with the
world that the human being shares with other animals. In
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sum, the relation of Desire does not express the ration-
ality of the subject, negates the identity of subject and
object, and fails to preserve the difference between sub-
ject and object within a "self-identical whole."
It is in its relation to a second subject that the
subject finds its first real identity with the object and
the sustenance for all subsequent identities. Another self
is part of the objective world, but it too has conscious-
ness and sees the self as its other. In its contact with
a second self, the subject becomes self-conscious for the
first time, for this particular object reflects its own
inner life and capacity for thought.
A self-consciousness has before it a self-
consciousness. Only so and only then is^ it
self-consciousness in actual fact; for here
first of all it comes to have the unity of it-
self in its otherness. . . . When a self-
consciousness is the object, the object is just
as much ego as object. ^-^
The subject secures its freedom in this second relation by
recognizing the object as a subject and by gaining the se-
cond subject's recognition of itself as a subject. Both
subjects set free each other's capacity for thought and
self-consciousness, and validate each other as self-
conscious beings. Furthermore, in the meeting of two
selves, "we already have before us the notion of Mind or
Spirit."''"'^ The identity of subjects becomes the basis for
the intersubjective world, which henceforth will mediate
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all subject/object relations, including those of Desire.
Hegel stresses that Recognition must be a relation of
equality. If the subject simply destroys the other self
in order to obtain freedom from it, it loses its knowledge
of itself in the other and the other's acknowledgement of
itself as subject. If it does not destroy the second self
but treats it oppressively, as less than an identical sub-
ject, it will not see its own, free self when it looks in-
to the mirror of the other but instead a self "in the form
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and shape of thinghood." Likewise, the recognition which
a less-than-full subject affords is inadequate, because it
is recognition by a lower and alien being. The subject is
as little confirmed in its relation to a lesser self, as
the latter is. As we shall see, Hegel does view the in-
equality of subjects as vital to the third subject/object
relation. In the relation of self to self, however, only
equality assures identity and hence freedom. One should
note that the necessary equality of subjects has ontolo-
gical rather than socio-political significance. It does
not preclude— and in fact Hegel believes that the Idea
demands--status distinctions among social beings.
"""^
We have seen that the human animal overcomes raw
nature by consuming it. But Desire is not the whole truth
of the relation of subject to matter; neither subject nor
object remain forever in a purely natural state. We also
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have seen that the subject realizes its identity with other
subjects through relations of mutual recognition. The
subject wins such recognition, however, only at the end of
a struggle with the other self as alien object. During
this struggle, one self succeeds for a time in dominating
the other. This phase of "lordship and bondage"—metaphor
for the emergence of psychological discipline within the
1
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self as well as of social discipline v;ithout --initiates
the third, critical relation of subject to object: that of
Labor. Forced to labor on raw nature in order to satisfy
his master's desires, the bondsman transforms nature from
raw matter into artifact and himself from desirous animal
into purposive agent. The satisfaction of brute desire
through immediate consumption leaves no traces in the
world, because desire "lacks objectivity." But when the
1
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subject labors, he "releases history from nature." For
labor
is desire restrained and checked. . . . Labour
shapes and fashions the thing. The negative re-
lation to the object passes into the form of the
object, into something that is permanent and re-
mains . . .-'-^
Through labor, the subject molds nature in accordance with
his purposes and ideas, so that it comes to reflect his
thought. He thus objectifies himself in the world, comes
to know himself in the world, and is at home with the
world as his own expression.
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Nonetheless, the labored object still has an inde-
pendent and external existence of its own--that recalci-
trant "otherness" of all physical things. The fourth
subject/object relation is a more fully internal one. This
is the relation of the individual subject to the "spiritual
world," which Heqel also calls "civilization," "culture,"
"nation," and the "system of right." The spiritual world
consists of the social relations in which the individual
subject is embedded, and the customs, moral norms, laws and
institutions which give these relations their specific con-
tent. It provides the context for all lesser relations of
Desire, Recognition, and Labor, and because it is the
source of the language in which the subject thinks, it me-
diates the highest subject/object relation as well. This
spiritual world the subject experiences first as a natural,
given way of life, and he identifies himself with its so-
cial bonds intuitively and unref lectively . He secondly
experiences it as a set of external relations, between
autonomous individuals, which are separate from him and
which are simply instrumental to his private needs and
wants. Third and finally, he comes to know and identify
himself with the spiritual world as both the source and ob-
jective reflection of his own rational thought and will.
Hegel articulates these three moments historically as the
ancient Greek city-state, the liberal order and and what
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he calls "Ethical Life." He articulates them structurally
as the family, the economy or Civil Society, and the State.
The fully developed State provides the subject v;ith his
identity as a member of a social community, but of a com-
munity founded on reason, not sentiment or unthinking ha-
bit. Its objective norms, rules and institutions are at
once the inner fabric of his ideas, desires and will,
which consequently
are interwoven with the general and essential con-
siderations of law, the good, duty, etc. For mere
desire, volition in its raw and savege form, falls
outside the scene and sphere of world history.
These general considerations, which at the same
time form norms for directing purposes and actions,
have a definite content . . . what special course
of action is good or not, right or wrong, is de-
termined, for the ordinary circumstances of ^private
life, by the laws and customs of the State.
Because the State gives his reason its particular content,
what the individual subject wishes to do does not conflict
with those actions which the system of right assigns to
him. Thus when he acts in accordance with his own will,
he acts in accordance with "a set of objective laws and
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institutions that are rational and universal in nature."
Conversely, when he follows the laws of the State, he fol-
lows only his mature, rational volition. His identity with
the State means that he is at home in his relations with
his fellow citizens, for the State provides them all with
a common moral substance and in turn expresses the "holy
bond" between them--their common thought or spirit.
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However, the State does not simply nourish and ob-
jectify the particular reason or "national spirit" of its
citizens. It also objectifies Universal Reason as the lat-
ter develops itself in history. Thus the customs, rules
and institutions of any particular social order have a re-
ference and significance outside of it, and some nations
will embody self-developinq Reason more adequately than
others. But since Reason elaborates and expresses itself
exactly through concrete particulars, one can discover
the standard of universal rationality only by looking with -
in a particular mode of life. More precisely, one must
look v/ithin an old and dying mode of life, as a vital cul-
ture still v/ill be in the process of creating both the
norms and institutions to be judged and the standard of
judgement. Hegel is as contemptuous of the idea of a con-
tent of reason in abstraction from a particular mode of
life, as he is of the idea that each particular mode of
life creates its own idiosyncratic standard of rationality.
He instead believes that the social theorist must be cog-
nizant of three layers of the cultural/moral universe. He
must penetrate the individual subject's ideas, values and
volition. He must understand the particular social whole
which nourishes these ideas and expresses them in objec-
tive form— and each social whole will have its own char-
acteristic spirit, ideas, and institutions of justice and
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right. Finally, he must uncover the immanent principles
of universal Reason, which realize themselves over time in
the spirit and actual practices of particular nations. In
sum, while Hegel always locates right within a particular
culture, and declares that the subject can know right only
as it is expressed variously in concrete thought and ac-
tion, he grounds the standard of right in universal prin-
ciples of reason and not in subjective opinion or the mo-
ral habits of individual cultures. His ethical theory, in
consequence, is anti-relativist, anti-sub jectivist , and
anti-intui tionist
.
It is important to note that Hegel's theory of
the State is entirely dependent for its support upon his
metaphysic. The organic connections he posits between
citizen and social whole have curious resonances with
both Burkeian conservatism and Rousseauian rationalism,
but Hegel roots these connections neither in the sancti-
ty of a common tradition nor in the legitimizing power
of participatory democracy. Instead, he rests the idea
of a harmonious identity of subject and social whole
on the twin claims that the idea of the State is reason
and hence freedom, and that the actual State realizes
its idea over historical time. He however offers no
substantive test independent of the self-image of any
particular social whole, of the rationality of its laws,
mores and institutions. In fact, he cannot offer such a
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test. Logically, he cannot, because he argues that the
content of rationality is furnished within the particular
social order itself. Tactically, he cannot, because the
viability of such a test would entail the possibility of
no state's passing it, of there being no state which is,
in the always unique terms of its own historical epoch,
the actualization of the true or ideal State. And with
this possibility would re-emerge the old Kantian dichotomy
between the ideal and the real world which Hegel had gone
to such lengths to overcome. Hegel, or rather "the concept
itself" does offer a formal test of the rational State: it
must be a unity of unity and difference. But this test is
unconvincing because it is thoroughly elastic. Hegel's
Prussian passed, and by coming up with different versions
of unity and difference, liberal and fascist states alike
can boast of embodying reason and, as is the more usual
claim, freedom. Consequently, to accept Hegel's vision of
the State as implicitly and more and more actually ration-
al, we either simply must take his word for it, or embrace
his idealism in toto, within which system the State as
concrete Reason makes as good sense as any other part.
Whether he is persuasive or not about the ration-
ality of the State, Hegel claims that in it the subject
achieves his most complete unity thus far with the objec-
tive world. He also achieves his most perfect freedom from
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alien objectivity, for here his will "is related to nothing
except itself and so is released from every tie of depen-
2 2dence on anything else." The relation of self to ra-
tional social whole is such an intimate one, that it al-
most is misleading to say that this whole is an object
opposed to the subject at all. Yet there is at least a
latent tension between the two. In part, the tension is
a spatial one, for the customs, laws, institutions and
practices of the State extend far beyond the boundaries of
the individual self. But the tension is also substantive:
it always is possible that the individual's beliefs, values
and purposes will come into conflict with the reason of
the established order. The latter contradiction between
State and individual in fact is a crucial symptom of the
decay of one mode of social life and the emergence of an-
other .
CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The relations of subject to raw nature, a second
subject, the labored product, and spirit, are progres-
sively internal relations of the self to its own reflec-
tion. Even the spiritual v/orld, however, still has an
existence separate from and in latent opposition to the
individual subject. In fact, Hegel claims, the subject
achieves a perfect identity with the object only in his
epistemological relation to it. By the act of thinking,
the subject takes the object out of its externality and
transforms it into an idea internal to mind.
In thinking an object, I make it into thought and
deprive it of its sensuous aspect; I make it into
something which is directly and essentially mine.
Since it is in thought that I am first by myself,
I do not penetrate an object until I understand
it; it then ceases to stand over against me and I
have taken from it the character of its own which
it had in opposition to me . . .^^
In fully rational thought, the mind strips the object of
all accidental and transient properties accruing to its
phenomenal existence, and captures its essence or reason.
The rational idea is neither a mere copy of sense data,
nor a distorted image of external reality, but rather is
the object's inner truth. Rational thought is not only
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the highest but also the most inclusive ontological rela-
tion of subject to object, because it enfolds all other
relations within itself. The thinking subject reflects on
its prior experiences, discards their incidental moments,
discerns and preserves their essential meanings, and there-
by absorbs its objective relations as pure thoughts within
its developing reason. But the subject does not engage
epistemologically with the object simply when it reflects
upon past experience. Experience is itself epistemologi-
cal: to experience an object, whether as raw nature or as
the State, is to have already taken it into ones conscious-
ness. The various objects which the subject confronts,
then, are at once distinctions within its own mind.
Hegel shows that the subject's attainment of true
knowledge of the object is an extremely laborious process.
Human thought undergoes a development which is logical,
loosely historical, and biographical ("The particular in-
dividual . . . has also to go through the stages through
which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once as-
sumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road
which has been worked over and levelled out." ) Each
stage entails a specific construction of objectivity or
mode of transforming the object into thought; it also en-
tails a specific interpretation of the activity of knowing.
Mind's theory of its own activity in part, but not in full.
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infects and circumscribes that activity. The dynamic of
thought arises out of the tension between the way in which
mind interprets knowledge and knows the object in accord-
ance with this interpretation, and the way in which it
knows the object in contradiction to this interpretation.
This tension pushes mind to elaborate increasingly more
adequate theories of knowledge, which allow for and arti-
culate an increasingly adequate construction of the ob-
ject of thought. Each new mode of thought comprehends and
surpasses the limitations of the last; and each has its
own, limited validity as a necessary moment in the develop-
ment of rational knowledge.
Hegel traces the temporal evolution of mind all
the way from the Stoicism and Scepticism of antiquity,
through 19th century German romanticism. The predominant
logical shapes mind manifests in history, and the major
claimants for the ascertainment of truth, are three: Bare
Experience, Scientific Understanding, and Philosophy. The
least adequate level and theory of knowledge. Bare Experi-
ence or "naive consciousness," is knowledge as the imme-
diate and passive reception of pure, unorganized sense
data; or at a slightly more sophisticated level, of unre-
lated objects with properties. Its self-interpreting
theory is akin to an empiricism of respectively the pheno-
menalist and object-realist sort. The second level and
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theory of knowledge is Scientific Understanding, which
arises out of the inability of Bare Experience to account
for knowledge which the mind in fact has of the world.
Scientific Understanding reflects upon the observable ob-
ject in order to discover its essential nature: its gener-
ic and species identity and its external, causal relations
with other objects. Science admits that this nature is
not immediately observable in the object but believes that
it can be inferred or abstracted from that which is ob-
servable. The highest level and theory of knowledge is
Philosophy or Speculative Science. Philosophy knows the
object ultimately through the deductive process of thought
alone, knows it as internally related to other objects and
as a necessary expression of the rational whole, and knows
Reason as the Absolute Subject which objectifies itself in
the observable world. Hegel insists that the epistemolo-
gical and explanatory supremacy of Philosophy does not an-
nul the worth of Scientific Understanding, or indeed of
Bare Experience. Experience has limited validity in its
being rooted in the actual world; Scientific Understanding,
in its rational mediation of bare sense impressions, its
preparation of particular facts into classif icatory uni-
versals and general laws. Philosophy then transforms em-
pirical into logical universality and necessity. It de-
rives the particular object from its self-particularizing
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universal or concept, and its concept from the self-
differentiating Idea. By warranting the contents of em-
pirical science absolutely and logically--rather than con-
tingently and empirically--necessary and universal, Phi-
losophy gives them "the freedom of thought," so that they
no longer depend for their truth on the evidence of the
sensed fact. "The fact as experienced thus becomes an il-
lustration and a copy of the original and completely self-
2 5supporting activity of Thought."
Hegel's analysis of Experience foreshadows con-
temporary critiques of both phenomenalism and object real-
2 6ism. According to Hegel, Experience as "sense-
certainty," the view that all knowledge is the passive re-
cipience of unique sense impressions, dissolves of itself
because non-conceptual sensation can yield no truth beyond
the bare fact that knower and known simply are. Mind of
course does know more than this--the very point of its con-
cept "knowledge" is to denote going beyond registering the
existence of otherwise uncharacterizeable particulars.
Conversely, knowledge as this going beyond cannot be ac-
quired through the passive recipience of sense data. To
know anything about a particular is at once to concep-
tualize— to organize experience by means of universals
subsuming (and for Hegel the inner truth of) both knower
and known, universals which by definition cannot be sensed.
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Without the conceptual activity of mind, the world would
be no more than an ephemeral series of the unmarked and
unmarkable. With it, the truth of the object "lies in the
object as my object, or lies in the meaning, in what I
27
'mean'." Experience as "perception," the view that it
is possible to know unrelated objects with properties
rather than mere sense-data does admit to the necessary
use of universals to designate the experiencing self and
the object and its properties. But perception cannot ac-
count for a given conglomerate of properties' being si-
multaneously a single object, v/ithout subverting the inde-
pendence of the object by attributing to mental activity
either the unifying of diverse properties into a single
entity, or the breaking down of a single entity into di-
verse properties. Further, perception's claim that each
object is wholly related to any other is contradicted by
its claim that what makes a thing itself and not another
thing, is a certain set of properties. For the very pro-
perties which make a thing what it is, relate it positive-
ly with other things with similar properties, and nega-
tively with other things with opposite properties.
Scientific Understanding contains the insights of
"sense-certainty," in that it begins with the directly
given sense impression. It contains the insights of "per-
ception" in that it v^orks with the sensed particular as a
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universal, rather than as a unique and unrepeatable phe-
nomenon. It goes beyond both in that it does not stop at
describing the sensible world, but penetrates its external
transient appearance to its non-sensible, permanent es-
sence. Scientific Understanding defines this essence as
the purely external relations which characterize the ob-
servable thing. These include the classif icatory rela-
tions between the individual and its species (the "self-
relation"); the causal relations between the individual
thing and other, different things (the "other-relation");
and the relations between the individual thing and other
things which express the workings of forces such as mag-
netism, gravity, and electricity. The observable object
mediates between the scientific mind and the "supersensi-
ble v;orld" of species, causal laws and forces. It is the
task of empirical science to infer general propositions
and theories from this particular object, to find "the
Necessary element, or Laws, in the apparent disorder of
2 8
the endless masses of the fortuitous." The theoretical
concepts of science, needless to say, are not merely con-
ventional but must conform to the system of nature. While
empirical science does not equate the true essence of
things with their sensible appearance, it still purports
to derive the relations between species and particular,
cause and effect, force and expression, from empirical
experience alone, so that these relations are only con-
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tingently true. Yet, Hegel notes, the fact that empirical
science assumes without the logical possibility of empiri-
cal proof that the laws it discovers are universal and
permanent, bespeaks an implicit awareness that these laws
are rooted in Reason and not in mere observable phenomena.
This dubious shov/ of support for empirical science
aside, Hegel argues that its self-interpretation is false,
its method is weak, and its understanding of the object
of inquiry, highly unsatisfactory. First, empirical Sci-
ence claims that its general ideas correspond to sensible
phenomena or are reducible to ideas which do so. While it
begins with the observable object, however, at the moment
of scientific analysis it ushers in concepts like "one,"
"many," "force," "cause," "contingency," which have no
concrete analogues in the physical world. Even material-
ism, the companion to empiricism which holds that all of
reality is reducible to physical matter, is a self-
deceptive form of idealism. For "matter" itself is a
thought or abstraction which corresponds to no sense-
datum at all. Most important, the very goal of Scientific
Understanding— the discovery of universal laws and neces-
sary connections between things--cannot be attained (as
29
Hume had noted) through sense perception alone. Of
course Hegel concludes differently than Hume: "And thus
once more we see the axiom of bygone metaphysics reappear.
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that the truth of things lies in thought. "'^^ Only to the
extent that science in practice contradicts empiricism in
theory, does it merit its title. Hegel is, however, in
sympathy v/ith empirical theory on one point.
In Empiricism lies the great principle that what-
ever is true must be in the actual world and pre-
sent to sensation. This principle contradicts
that ' ought- to-be . ' ... No less than Empiricism,
philosophy recognizes only what is, and has no-
thing to do with what merely ought to be.-^-^
Both empiricism and absolute idealism deny any methodolo-
gical ground for criticizing a given order of things. Em-
piricism does so, because it believes only in the truth of
strictly observable facts, so that it is confined within
the boundaries of "what is." Absolute Idealism does so,
for a quite opposite reason: it asserts that the actual,
observable world is expressive of Thought, so that the
actual is already rational.
Second, Hegel finds inadequate the method by which
science explains the observable thing in terms of species,
laws and forces. These generalizations, after all, are
only repetitions in universal and permanent form of the
particular, transient cases they purport to explain. To
account for the fact that b does x when c does y, by the
law that whenever C does Y, B does X, is to state merely
the same content as before, "translated into the form of
inwardness. "-^^ In any case, the external and contingent
relations science finds in the world, do not provide mind
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with an ultimate knov;ledge of first principles and final
33 ^ . .
,causes. Empirical science only explains the observable
thing in terms of some contingent factor, which "may or
may not be
. . .
whose being or not being . . . depends
34not on Itself but on something else." Hegel believes
that a necessity dependent on antecedent conditions which
themselves are unnecessary, is not as powerful an explana-
tion as a necessity v/hich simply and categorically is, "a
simple self-relation , in which all dependence on something
3 5
else IS removed." Lastly, the necessity exhibited in
causal laws and forces is a blind one. It does not know
itself, and it does not determine itself. It then is of a
lesser order than the necessity which stems from a self-
conscious, self-determining Reason.
Because of these methodological limitations, em-
pirical science can comprehend nothing of Universal Rea-
son as the inner content of the world, a good deal (but not
the full truth) of physical nature, and very little of pur-
posive, intersubjective human life. Science begins to
have difficulties, Hegel believes, when it tries to ex-
plain the behavior of simple, unconscious organic life.
The simple organism is governed by a concealed purpose or
"notion"--the preservation of its identity--and this pur-
pose cannot be observed or inferred purely from observable
„ 3 7
facts, but "can only be apprehended conceptually." Sci-
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ence confronts its most serious problems, however, when it
seeks to explain self-conscious human life. First, psycho-
logical science looks at mind as a passive, determined
thing. It treats mind as an entity which is separate from
its objective relations, and explains it in terms of exter-
nal factors and causes. In truth, Hegel asserts--and this
is his most critical point--, the individual mind is fused
with its objective world, for in the hierarchy of v/ays al-
ready examined, this world reflects and gives content to
the subject. Since the mind is internally related to its
situation, any explanation is moot which presumes a clear
distinction between cause and effect and treats mind as
determined by something fully independent of it. Second,
3 8
science as physiognomy and phrenology identifies the in-
ner self with permanent mental dispositions it infers from
3 9
sensible physical traits. Hegel first of all strongly
condemns the attempt to view the body as expressive of the
mind. The inner body, whether as bone structure or inter-
nal organs, is simply a physical given and has no internal
connection to consciousness. Certain facets of the ex-
terior body, the eyes or mouth, for example, may express
the mind, but only insofar as the inner self can manipu-
late them at will. In short, the particular shape of the
body has no direct relation to the particular content of
the mind. The body is largely a medium through which the
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mind expresses itself in speech and action, and conversely
it is at speech and action that one looks in order to know
the inner self of another person. Hegel secondly refuses
to attribute the subject's words and acts to some static
psychological disposition. Rather, he believes that they
reflect the subject's inner development towards reason and
self-determination. This development both is natural to
the human subject and, as Hegel noted earlier, is informed
by the specific ideas of justice, duty, and right which
the subject finds in his social world.
According to Hegel, Philosophy is the highest level
and theory of knowledge. Only Philosophy is able to grasp
the conscious life of the human subject, the inner meaning
of its speech and actions, the intersub jective norms and
rules which help constitute social relations, and the Rea-
son which underlies all things. The content of Philosophy,
which Hegel also calls "Speculative Science" and "Absolute
Knowledge," is no more and no less than Hegel's own philo-
sophical system. It includes the system's entire sweep
from the self-deduction of the Abstract Idea through its
externalization as nature, its development as human sub-
jectivity in its various relations to the object, and its
consciousness of itself as the unity of Thought and the
phenomenal world. Because Philosophy is just this "Day-
light of the Idea's development and revealed riches,
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Hegel's climactic discussion of it is very short. Abso-
lute Knowledge is simply if momentously the announcement
of the full fruition of all that has gone before, the
whole journey of Thought travelled and recollected. Be-
fore we examine the form or method of Philosophy, we should
remember that it does reserve a place for empirical sci-
ence as a progressive if lesser mode of knowledge. Sci-
entific Understanding marks the limited triumph of the
independent, reflective, analytic mind, which is able to
make its discoveries exact] y because it assumes a stance
of detachment tov/ards the world around it. Philosophy
does not entirely invalidate those discoveries when it re-
veals both subject and object to be expressive of Mind.
Rather, it heals the wound opened by Scientific Under-
standing: the alienation of the human subject from the ob-
jective world, and the subject's explanation of itself as
determined by external, objective causes.
CHAPTER III
THE METHOD OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCE
We turn now to the method v/hich at once governs
the real development of the world, and provides the most
complete knowledge of it. The dialectic is both the in-
ner dynamic of existence and the true form of scientific
analysis. It is the second because it is the first: the
dialectic of the concept "is not an activity of subjective
thinking applied to some matter externally, but is rather
the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and
42fruit organically." Because the movement of the objec-
tive world determines the proper form of explanation, mind
must look on at its subject-matter "without for its part
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adding to it any ingredient of its own." This of
course does not mean that the truth of reality is trans-
parent to simple sensory observation. Hegel has shown
that to know is at once to mediate the empirically given
with thought, and that to know scientifically is to pierce
through phenomenal reality to its rational essence. Fur-
thermore, the dialectical method of explanation is a
highly sophisticated one which emerges only after a long
development of the human mind. Because he sees his sci-
entific method as internal both to objective reality and
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to human history, by the way, Hegel can account for his
own thought with complete theoretical ease. This is an
intellectual pleasure in which the empirical scientist
cannot indulge.
Every actual thing involves a coexistence of op-
posed elements. Consequently to know, or in
other words, to comprehend an object is equiva-
lent to being conscious of it as a concrete unity
of opposed determinations.^''
The central insight of dialectical thinking, and
the central core of dialectical reality, is that the whole
is a concrete unity of opposites. The method, however,
embraces three stages or "moments" which lead to this
unity. (1) The first moment of the method as existential
dynamic is the existence and subsistence of finite,
atomic things--whe ther these are particular rocks, trees
and persons or particular epochs, cultures and philoso-
phies--to which certain predicates characteristically ap-
ply and other characteristically do not. Because the
world is differentiated in this way, the first moment of
the method as scientific analysis is the division of its
subject-matter into fixed and limited universals, each of
which is distinct from and exclusive of the others. Thus,
for example, one divides "philosophy" into "classical
idealism," "skepticism," "realism" etc., in such a way
that "idealism" includes only "its own" ideas and not
those characteristic of "realism" or "skeptcism." Such
59
analytic activity is indispensable for knowledge, which
requires that "every thought shall be grasped in its full
precision, and nothing allowed to remain vague and inde-
4 5finite." (2) However, contrary to the claims of em-
piricism, every existent thing only on one side is a
"self-identical," fixed, and independent being. On the
other side, it is fraught with internal contradictions.
Later we will examine the principle of contradiction which
leads every particular thing to transform itself and
which subverts its independent identity. For now we need
note only that a thing can contradict itself because it
is expressive of an idea—or rather, of two ideas: the
idea of itself as a perfected being, and the idea of it-
self as an independent, self-limiting whole. It will
suffer contradiction if it is a less than adequate ex-
4 6pression of either. The opposition inherent in all
finite things forces scientific thought beyond its own
boundaries. Since "[t]here is absolutely nothing what-
ever in which we cannot and must not point to contradic-
tions or opposite attributes ,"
^
^ the conceptual distinc-
tions science makes in its first moment, it undermines in
its second. (3) Empiricism believes the world to be made
of positive facts, and knowledge of true statements about
them. Skepticism believes that knowledge ends in the ne-
gation of all positive statements about the world and so
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in the negation of knowledge itself. Hegel insists a-
gainst both that "the negation which emerges as the re-
sult of the dialectic is, because a result, at the same
4 8time positive." As it is the negation of "specific
propositions," it has its own, specific and positive con-
tent. The third moment of the dialectic yields not a
mere denial of a given, fixed truth, but a more developed
and internally harmonious existent, and a more articulated
4 9
and complete thought of it. The dialectic process re-
conciles positive and negative moments in a higher, new
positive one, and then begins anew. The more developed
object negates itself, and the more inclusive thought
presses beyond its old boundaries. The end of existen-
tial and epis temological dialectic somes only with the
Thought of the Infinite Whole: the reality which encloses
every contradictory existent within itself, and the
thought beyond which it is impossible to travel.
We have established that Hegel's dialectical me-
thod is both scientific analysis and real dynamic, and
that as both analysis and dynamic it entails three mo-
ments or stages. We now must examine the fundamental
principles of which the method is made.
Appearance is the process of arising into being
and passing away again, a process that itself
does not arise and does not pass away, but is
per se, and constitutes reality and the life-
movement of truth.
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The most obvious and the most abstract principle of the
method is that of movement. It is an obvious principle
because of the dynamic quality inherent in a method which
moves restlessly from unproblematic truth to its disin-
tegration through internal contradiction to a new unprob-
lematic truth. It is an abstract principle because to
say that reality is inherently in motion and flux is not
to say very much. A second, more articulated expression
of the dialectic is that it is self-movement . An un-
problematic truth negates itself
,
and both truth and ne-
gation are collected and retained in a more complete
truth. Here we have the kernel of Hegel's entire meta-
physic. It is unnecessary to retrace the imminent dy-
namic of the system of Reason as a whole, in which Rea-
son posits itself as Abstract Thought, negates itself as
Abstract Thought and posits itself as the external world,
and finally returns to itself as the self-conscious unity
5
1
of the two moments. But it is worth noting that to
crack the self-movement of this Whole at any point is to
find a part which is itself a smaller whole in its own
process of self-movement. Crack open this second whole,
and one will find yet another. The Idea; and within the
Idea the spheres of Logic, Nature, and Spirit; within the
sphere of Logic, the categories of Being, Essence, and
Notion; and within the category of Notion, the Objective
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Notion, Subjective Notion, and Idea—each undergoes an
immanent development in which it both negates and retains
every particular moment within itself. This self-movement
becomes even more complex in the realm of Spirit. For
here, not only is there a logical sel f
-development from,
for example, family to civil society to the state within
the whole of Ethical Life, or from art to religion to
philosophy within the whole of Absolute Knowledge; but
each of these self-moving wholes and each whole within it
undergoes a temporal development as well--that is, has a
52history. All of this movement and change except that
which is pure "caprice" or "sport" manifests some aspect
5 3
of the Concept's "elaborations upon itself." Conse-
quently, in contrast to the empirical scientist who be-
gins with concrete particulars and abstracts from them
universals which name their common characteristics, the
dialectical scientist looks to the abstract universal
which will produce out of itself its concrete determina-
tions. The point of scientific analysis, admonishes He-
gel, in a statement which sums up the idealist explana-
tory enterprise, "is to look at the way in which the con-
cept determines itself and to restrain ourselves from
adding thereto anything of our thoughts and opinions."
All of reality, then, is marked by self -movement
,
but to explain how this movement occurs one must point to
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that most infamous dialectical principle, contradiction
.
"Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world
.
. .
[although] contradiction is not the end of the mat-
5 5ter, but cancels itself." Every determinate thought,
thing, and moment comes into conflict with itself and
transforms itself into its opposite or negation. Na-
ture's negation of the Idea, and Spirit's negation of Na-
ture, are archetypal. In every lesser entity lurks the
5 6same "portentous power of the negative." This power,
however, is itself a new positive content: Nature, for
example, is not simply "not-Idea," but is the positive
content of the external, material world. The process of
the self-movement of any whole is just this succession of
positive forms. Further, each new positive retains the
truth of its predecessors. Nature is the externalization
as well as the negation of the Idea (it is the "Idea
asleep"). Spirit is Mind which not only negates but has
developed out of Nature and retains the whole of that de-
velopment in thought. Thus a negation is not like an
illusion that is broken upon the advent of the truth.
The concept
determines itself, posits its own determinations
and in turn abolishes them (transcending itself)
,
and by this very process of abolition and trans-
cending gains an affirmative, ever richer and
more concretely determined form.
The negations which become positive forms, the positive
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forms which issue in their own negations, and the moment
of negation itself, are expressions of the Whole and are
retained within it as partial truths.
What exactly does Hegel mean when he says that a
thought or thing contradicts itself? (1) Every determi-
nate thought, because it has a specific and so a bounded
content, is in contradiction with itself as an expression
of the Thought of the Whole. For every determinate
thought can be thought beyond. This inner contradiction
leads each thought past its own boundaries to its nega-
tion--a new, more comprehensive thought inclusive of the
truth of the old. (2) Every determinate thing which has
not yet realized its own idea, is not what it truly is.
This contradiction leads the thing beyond the limits of
its present existence, to a more perfect expression of
its essential self. Since every particular thing is fi-
nite, however, it eventually decays and dies; its idea is
preserved through the preservation of its species or
type. The relation of natural particulars to their uni-
versal is a static one: each new particular simply repli-
cates the idea of the last, and the universal is pre-
served through this repetition of particulars. The rela-
tion of spiritual particulars to their universal is dy-
namic: the various ideas which the particulars express
are progressive elaborations of their spiritual universal.
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For example, each particular state has its own idea which
it strives to realize, and the historical series of par-
ticular states and their qualitatively distinctive ideas
reveals, over time, the developing universal Idea of the
State. (3) Every finite, determinate thing is in contra-
diction with itself as the idea of an independent whole.
For the fact that a thing is determinate and finite means
that it is bounded, and this entails that it is bounded
by something other than itself. This "other," then, helps
determine the finite thing and is included within the
thing's identity. Thus the finite thing is all that it
is not and so is negated as a self-identical entity.
(Hegel believes that the thing not only entails its
"other" but actively seeks to become its other by going
beyond its own boundaries. This occurs when a thing al-
ters itsel f
.
)
In truth, however, the "other" which negates the
independence of every determinate thing is, along with
that thing, a companion part of a larger whole. The re-
lations the thing has with other things are then not ex-
ternal and contingent but internal and necessary rela-
tions, so that the thing is not limited and determined
by an alien fo-ce but is, as part of the larger whole,
self-limiting and self-determining. A consequence of
the principle of internal relations is that to understand
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the particular thing is to understand it in its relations
with all other things within a given whole. For example,
a particular set of laws must be understood against the
habits, mores, institutions, etc., which along with the
lav/s express a particular national culture or "spirit."
This particular whole provides the first context for the
explanation of the particular thing but, in that the whole
itself is an organic part of a larger whole, not the last.
Thus, the terms of explanation for particular laws in-
clude not only their internal relations to other parts of
a particular national spirit, but also the internal rela-
tions of that national spirit to other national spirits
which are parts of the se 1 f-developing "World Spirit."
Ultimately, the contradiction inherent in every finite
thing is resolved only when that thing is shown to be a
part of the Infinite Whole or Idea, which has no limits
and hence is not in contradiction with some other thing
which lies beyond itself.
The determinate thing, then, is a necessary part
of a larger whole. This principle of necessity underlies
the apparent contingency of things in the world. Because
the world is external, material, and temporal, it is mar-
red by true contingency: by pure "sport" or "caprice,"
the irrational thing, event, or action which "may as well
not be as be."^^ But most of what appears to be contin-
67
gent is in truth the manifestation of its particular idea
and the Idea of the Whole. While the historian concerns
himself with the narration of appearance, whether it be
truly fortuitous or not, the task of the scientist is
first to fathom the rational Idea of the V^/hole, second to
expose the inner necessity of the only apparently contin-
gent particulars, and to treat the fortuitous not at all.
The principle of necessity accrues to the dynamic
of each particular whole as well as to its composition at
any one moment or stage. Given that this is so, and
given that each whole is self-moving rather than moved by
an external cause, the entire content of its development
must be implicit in its first, most abstract and unarticu-
lated moment. That the dynamic of reality tends of its
own internal necessity toward an inherent end is a fifth
principle of the Hegelian dialectic. This teleological
principle applies to the method as analysis also: "the
whole progress of philosophizing in every case, if it be
a methodical, that is to say a necessary, progress,
,,6 0
merely renders explicit what is implicit in a notion.
The dialectic is a succession of positive moments, each
born out of and negating the last, but the process is not
one of spontaneous self-creation . It is rather a becoming
explicit through self-struggle of a series of moments each
implicit in the last. The whole which develops according
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to an inner necessity develops freely— that is, according
to its own purpose. The Idea depends on nothing from with-
out itself; it is
its own exclusive pre-supposi tion and absolutely
final purpose, and itself works out this purpose
from potentiality into actuality, from inward
source to outward appearance
. . . this Idea or
Reason is the True, the Eternal, the Absolute
Power ... it and nothing but it . . . mani-
fests itself in the world . . .^^
Hegel's brief discussion of philosophy in his pre-
face to the Phenomenology exemplifies the principle of
teleological development through contradiction. The vari-
ous philosophical systems of the past, Hegel remarks, seem
independent and indeed mutually exclusive of each other.
In reality, they constitute in their very antagonisms
6 2
"the progressive evolution of truth." Although else-
where Hegel distinguishes historical development through
internal struggle from a naturally pacific organic tele-
ology, here he likens the history of philosophy to the
growth of a plant. The bud is supplanted by the flower,
with which it is incompatible; the flower by the fruit.
Yet each is part of the same organic whole, within which
they are both contradictory and mutually necessary. Phi-
losophy likewise evolves through a progression of antago-
nistic systems, each incompatible with the next, yet all
necessary parts of, and reconciliable within, the whole
of philosophic knowledge. The different philosophical
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systems are "one philosophy at different degrees of ma-
turity. ... In philosophy the latest birth of time is
the result of all the systems that have preceded it, and
must include their principles; and so . . . will be the
fullest, most comprehensive and most adequate system of
„ 6 4
all" (in this sense, unlike the relation of fruit to
flower)
.
A consequence for scientific analysis of the
teleological pirnciple is that one must look to the more
developed self to explain the less. At the same time,
the truth of the whole is not only its final stage, but
is the entire process of its working out.
The historical advance of Spirit from implicit
possibility to explicit actuality through "hard, infinite
6 5
struggle against itself," is most dramatically illus-
6 6trated in Hegel's conception of social change. Here
the World Spirit develops through the emergence, matura-
tion, and disintegration of particular national spirits.
As we have seen, a national spirit or state is the to-
tality of habits, traditions , moral and legal duties and
rights, a constitution, an artistic, scientific, and
philosophic temperament, which have a common principle and
which a given people share. "Only with such a religion
can there be such a form of the State, and only with such
6 7
a State such art and such philosophy." The particular
nation is limited and mortal, with its own cycle of de-
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velopment and decline. Vital as long as it is bringing
its inner principle from potentiality to concrete ac-
tuality, the state in its maturity loses its dynamism.
Its citizens have completed their struggle of self-
creation, and have the leisure to lean back to reflect
on themselves. Such self-reflection is a corrosive act.
It leads them beyond the authority of their ethical or-
der, to question long-established rights, duties, and
customs. This self-critique of a social order marks the
emergence of a new spiritual principle and a more inclu-
sive standard of rationality. The hidden secret of every
social whole— that it contains within itself the seeds of
a new, higher principle-- "makes all existing reality un-
6 8
stable and disunited." Within the old world, the inner
spirit of the new is "already knocking ... as against a
shell, in order, finally, to burst forth and break it
into pieces; but it is a kernel different from that which
belongs to the shell. "^^ The old order crumbles away,
and a new one arises which begins its own process of de-
velopment, self-reflection, and decline.
While the thought and action of the masses help
build and maintain a particular spiritual order, it is
the rare "world-historical individual" who brings into
being a new social whole. Hegel's theory of the world-
historical figure shows his perceptive grasp of the tran-
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sitional historical mentality (confined, however, to the
minds of a few great men) and his ultimately idealist
explanation of human action. The world-historical indi-
vidual acts according to private passions and purposes
subversive of the established state. He understands the
limitations of the old age and the truth of the new, "the
next genus, so to speak, which is already formed in the
7 0womb of time." But these passions and purposes are the
guise through which the will of the World Spirit secretly
works. Not being philosophers, the world-historical in-
dividuals know nothing of the Idea as such, but they make
its immanent reality their own personal aim and goal. And
so their actions have two explanations, only one of which
is transparent to themselves.
The World Spirit then consists of a progression
of finite national spirits: "The restless succession of
individuals and peoples, who exist for a time and then
disappear," but whose ruin "is at the same time the emer-
7
1
gence of a new life." It is also a progression of ra-
tionality, self-consciousness , and freedom. Each new
stage of Spirit entails a richer history and self-
understanding, a more universal standard of reason, and
hence a higher level of freedom than the last.
While the dialectical method is able to grasp
this transformative process, there is one claim Hegel does
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not make on its behalf. He nowhere suggests that the
speculative scientist can determine the state of any la-
ter stage—whether of history or of being--on the basis
of information he has at or about an earlier stage. The
dialectical idealist can be certain that every positive
moment will produce out of itself its necessary antithe-
sis, and that this will be a new, necessary positive mo-
ment. But he cannot know the content of this moment in
advance of it, for two reasons. First, one can predict
neither the ontological nor historical new moment on the
basis of regularities characteristic of an earlier one,
for this new moment negates not only those regularities,
but the identities involved in them. That is, the new
moment negates "Whenever A, then B" as a relation, and
also negates A as (the old) A, B as (the old) B. Se-
cond, given that one cannot predict the historical future
on the basis of present regularities, one cannot predict
it on any other basis, because the mind is always caught
in its own time. It can think only within the terms of
its culture, language, past and present; it cannot know
any future expression of Reason because it is itself an
expression of Reason only as the latter has developed it-
self thus far. That it is impossible to know a later
moment on the basis or from the stance of an earlier one,
means that dialectical idealism, which purports to be a
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deductive system, can be one only of a most singular
sort. The scientist cannot deduce a conclusion on the
basis of a knowledge of the premises alone, but must un-
cover the movement from premise to conslusion only after
that movement has taken place. He does not, then, de-
duce the facts of the world from the Concept, and the
Concept from an a priori premise. Rather, he examines
the experience of thinking, which leads of itself to the
Concept, and with the help of the categories of the Con-
cept, he examines the experience of the phenomenal world.
Here he discloses the inner rationality which the Con-
72
cept guarantees. In sum, he reconstructs the advance
from Concept to Nature to Spirit "after the fact."
CHAPTER IV
SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE EXPLANATION
OF HUMAN ACTION
It is striking that Hegel, fully aware of the
gains made by the empirical sciences in the past century,
equates true science with philosophy, and philosophy with
"7
knowledge of "notions or conceptions alone." His vi-
sion of philosophy is in part Platonic. The philosopher's
task is to reveal the concept as the rational truth of
the world. He can know this truth neither through intui-
tion nor common sense, but only by means of an arduous
process of mental training and intellectual discipline.
A regulative principle prohibiting fanciful hypotheses,
mere subjective opinions, and peculiarities of mind, go-
verns the philosophical enterprise and makes it syste-
matic. Hegel ascribes a dynamic quality not only to mind
but also to the world it thinks about, and in this way his
idealism is more Aristotelian than Platonic. Ideas are
immanent in the concrete world and inform the development
of all things. However, Hegel parts with both classical
thinkers when he declares that ideas and the concrete
world are internal distinctions of Thought, and Thought
develops itself through contradiction, negation, and
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struggle. Thus he conceives of the Notion as the self
which brings opposition out of itself; of scientific
thinking as "a self having knowledge purely of itself in
the absolute antithesis of itself;^^ and of scientific
proof as the account of "how the subject by and from it-
self makes itself what it is."^^
Empirical science retains a legitimate place with-
in the system of Speculative Science, but it suffers
there a definite if gently executed decline in status.
Hegel's greatest complaint against empirical science--
that it cannot fathom the Infinite Reason of the v/orld--
has long since lost its intellectual appeal for philo-
sophers and social theorists, although it still is the
crux of the theological position. However, Hegel makes a
series of secondary arguments which foreshadows the con-
temporary case against positivism. He believes that po-
sitive science, with its fixed propositions and static
vision of a universe governed by natural laws, cannot
comprehend the internal dynamic to which all things are
subject. Further, it confines itself to the study of the
physically observable, which it sees as the only truth or
at least the only truth amenable to scientific investiga-
tion. Hence it is blind to the full reality of social
life. It cannot grasp the internal rationality of human
action, which each particular mode of social life both
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supports and reflects. It cannot penetrate the inner
logic of social practice, of which human actors may or
may not be aware. It cannot appreciate the historicity
of action--the continual emergence of new forms of social
life and new modes of thought and practice. Finally, be-
cause it understands neither the ideational component nor
the dynamic quality of social life, it cannot understand
itself--for of course empirical science is a product of
mind which arises only at a specific moment in history.
Certain features of Hegel's explanatory method,
in turn, anticipate contemporary non-posi tivist analysis.
His theory of the dialectic portrays the world as made of
qualitatively distinct levels of existence. It stipu-
lates that the characteristics of each higher level are
more inclusive than and not reducible to the character-
istics of any lower level. The dialectic then assures
both a continuity of method in the analysis of natural
and social life, and a discontinuity between the terms of
explanation appropriate for social life and the terms of
explanation appropriate for simple physical nature. The
dialectic also governs practical innovation in social
life, and accommodates the fact that the identities and
regularities which mark one historical epoch will not ne-
cessarily be true of the next. Finally, it informs not
only practical but conceptual innovation: the dynamic of
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human thought as it creates and then moves beyond its own
limitations, as it reflects upon and transforms its own
content.
The primary problem for non-idealist dialecticians
becomes one of finding a support other than that of a
self-developing Idea, for a dialectic of nature, history,
and human consciousness. In the century and a half after
Hegel's death, at least three possibilities have been sug-
gested. Each is less than adequate in scope, each is
closely connected to the others, and each is quite clear-
ly intimated in the pages of Hegel's own texts. The Dar-
winian theory of natural evolution provides a strictly
materialist basis for the self-transformation of physical
nature, which at some point issues in conscious and self-
conscious life. Whether or not Darwin himself was reduc-
tionist in his account of mind, emergence theorists of
nature need not and indeed should not be so. Marxist
analysis traces the historical transformation of nature,
human nature, and social life, to the central activity of
purposive human labor. Finally, it is the heart of the
ordinary language and phenomenological argument, that re-
ality is socially constructed not only through practical
labor but through conceptual thought. Persons think with-
in culturally and politically specific conceptual frame-
works which identify and limit, among other things, the
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possibilities for human action. The promise of practical
innovation rests in part in the capacity of persons to
reflect on and move beyond old conceptual limits, and so
beyond old limits of what actions are possible in their
world
.
Ironically, while Marxists have been particularly
anxious to shed Hegel's metaphysic while preserving his
method, they alone have shown sympathy for two of the most
idealist aspects of the dialectic. The first of these
aspects is that the internal contradiction within every
thing is the contradiction between the thing and its ne-
cessary opposite.
Usually we regard different things as unaffected
by each other. . . . Everything is thus put out-
side every other. But the aim of philosophy is to
banish indifference, and to ascertain the neces-
sity of things. . . . Thus, for example, inorganic
nature is not to be considered merely something
else than organic nature, but the necessary anti-
thesis of it.^^
Hegel here declares that the different thing is not sim-
ply different from but a negation of the first thing. He
also declares that this negation is not simply a new,
antagonistic moment which issues from and yet is incom-
patible with the old, the way a new twist in the rela-
tionship between husband and wife might be corrosive of
an established set of familial relations. Rather, the
negation is the thing's necessary opposite , and therefore.
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because anything in internal contradiction must give way
to its negation (which is at once a new positive) , its
necessary outcome or conclusion. This deductive concept
of negation meshes with Hegel's vision of the world as
the embodiment of rational necessity. However, once
one drops his idealist assumptions, there is no suffi-
cient reason for the claim that organic nature, for ex-
ample, is the only possible antithesis of inorganic na-
ture rather than simply a new level of nature, in oppo-
sition to, because incompatible with, the definitive pro-
perties of the old. This point becomes most pressing
when one looks at the dialectic of social formations.
Only an abstract logic of history can provide sufficient
grounds for the claim that the new principles and prac-
tices which undermine an established social order from
within, are not only its negation but its necessary nega-
tion. The non-idealist is constrained to make the more
modest case.
The second idealist aspect of the dialectic to
which Marxists are attracted is its progressive portrait
of history. That history is progressive can mean tv/o
things, and Hegel takes it to mean both. First, he be-
lieves that each new positive moment of history includes
the truth of its predecessors— it accumulates and sur-
passes their content and so is richer or more "intelli-
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gent." For example, each new philosophical system not
only moves beyond but also contains the knowledge of all
past systems. Each new technological epoch incorporates
as well as outdates the advances of its forebearers. Each
new artistic genre not only reacts against but responds to
a longer artistic heritage. This reading of history
stands up without the assumption of an abstract histori-
cal Reason, given one important condition: that each
stage of social life remembers its past, although this
memory need not be a self-conscious one. Second, Hegel
believes that each new positive moment of history embo-
dies to a greater degree than its predecessors, the Idea
of Reason and Freedom. While the progress of history is
not linear, but occurs through Spirit's "infinite strug-
gle" against itself, it nonetheless is governed by an im-
manent end. Now, just as it is contradictory for non-
idealists to hold that abstractions like "history" move
according to an inner logic, it is contradictory for them
to hold that such abstractions seek to realize their own
ends or goods. Thus they only illicitly represent the
movement of history as progressive in this second sense.
In sum, there are certain pretensions of Hegel's
dialectic in which the non-idealist cannot indulge. She
cannot argue that a logical necessity governs natural,
historical, or conceptual transformation; or deduce, even
after the fact, any one stage out of another. (Neither,
if she is to use dialectical reason at all, can she pre-
dict the content of any later stage on the basis of regu-
larities holding true at an earlier one.) Likewise, she
cannot view any of these processes as teleological in and
of themselves. They do not have their own, immament pur-
poses or strive to attain a completed, perfect state, even
though they may be made in part of the purposes and ends
of human actors. They are progressive only in the sense
and to the extent that each new stage of nature, history,
or human thought is more comprehensive, elaborate, and
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"intelligent" than the last. Finally, the non-idealist
cannot presume that the world is essentially rational.
She only can assert that (1) to the extent that humans
shape the world in the ways they intend, the world em-
bodies their reason as it develops within a particular
mode of life; and (2) nature and history, including the
history of unintended consequences, are at least partially
intelligible to the human mind. This last point is a tru-
ism. In that it creates its own standard of intelligi-
bility, human reason will be able to understand at least
some things.
His metaphysical claims aside, Hegel created a
method of penetrating a world of ceaseless struggle and
creative activity to which positivistic science has no
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access. But he did more than this. He also constructed
a dual mode of analysis which laid the groundwork for both
interpretive and critical social theory. On the one hand,
he argues that human actors collectively build an edifice
of law and moral rules which nurtures and reflects their
immanent reason. Thus socially mediated purposes, norms,
and beliefs progressively replace natural instincts and
external causes as the determinants of human action. On
the other hand, Hegel does not explain action simply or
even primarily in terms of the self-interpretations of
human agents. When he looks at the most crude and brutal
action as well as the most thoughtful and dutiful, he sees
it as expressive of an objective Reason of which human
actors are unaware.
[H]uman actions in history produce additional
results, beyond their immediate purpose and at-
tainment, beyond their immediate knowledge and
desire. They gratify their own interests; but
something more is thereby accomplished, which
is latent in the action though not present in
their consciousness and not included in their
design.
Hegel believes that the history of human action has been
a fundamentally opaque one, in which actors have not un-
derstood the full extent of what they are doing. Conse-
quently, the speculative scientist must examine that his-
tory on two levels: the level of appearance , which includes
the concrete practices of social life and the human mean-
ings and intentions which inform it; and the level of
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reality, which includes the self
-development of the ra-
tional Idea. These two levels, however, are not irre-
trievably distinct. The same historical process by which
humans free themselves from the dictates of the instincts
and the pressures of external forces, takes them towards
a knowledge of the principles of objective Reason. When
actors articulate their desires and intentions completely
in accordance with rational principles, and act in accord-
ance with their intentions, an interpretive account of
their social life will mirror an account in terms of its
inner Idea.
While Hegel's emphasis on intersubjective meanings
and intentionality is congenial to contemporary interpre-
tive theorists, his distinction between appearance and
3
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reality is far more appealing to critical theorists,
who readily concur that "in a simple act something fur-
ther may be implicated than lies in the intentions and
8 2
consciousness of the agent." However, because Hegel
believes that a hidden Reason manifests itself in the
concrete practices of human beings, he finds these prac-
tices in reality to be always more, never less, rational
than they appear. Modern critical theorists make impor-
tant revisions in this reading of opacity. They attri-
bute the appearance/reality split to the fact that humans
themselves author objective constraints, of which they
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are unaware, which then determine their actions. These
actors may believe that they autonomously determine what
they are doing, or they may think that they are governed
by unchangeable natural laws. They may believe that their
action is governed by neither private aims nor natural
laws, but by social rules, without comprehending the in-
terests those rules protect or the objective constraints
which maintain those interests. In each case, opacity
bespeaks a loss of control by human actors over their ac-
tions, so that these actions in reality are less rational
than they appear to be
.
Like their critical counterparts, interpretive
theorists reject the notion that a hidden Reason ex-
presses itself in social life. They differ among them-
selves over whether practice is opaque in other ways.
The most conservative among them believe opacity to be a
permanent feature of social practice. They see opacity
as originally a function of the primitive state of human
knowledge and later a function of the extreme complexity
of social organization. Slightly less conservative
thinkers view actions as always at least implicitly trans-
parent to their authors, who are aware that their action
is rule-governed although they may not be able to articu-
late at once the rule their action expresses. Their
self-understanding provides the basis for a sufficient
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explanation of their action. Lastly, certain interpre-
tive theorists argue that actions may be partially, but
never can be fully, opaque to their own authors. Thus
social life must be explained by reference to social
rules and intersub jective meanings, structural con-
straints, and the intentions and beliefs of human actors.
Such theorists generally believe that human action can
become fully transparent, given certain changes in social
life which have yet to occur. These usually are said to
involve transformations in the labor process, as well as,
of course, transformations in human consciousness.
One of Hegel's most cogent insights is that the
content of philosophy is not a timeless body of truths.
Instead, it is the self-reflection of a particular social
8 3
whole, "its own time apprehended in thought." He also
believes that the philosopher's sole task is to contem-
plate the rational principle already actualized in his
social order. That philosophy only can mirror the truth
of the present conflicts with Hegel's own insight into
the corrosive nature of self-reflection, which leads the
self beyond customary boundaries of thought and practice.
For the absolute idealist, this conflict is an inevitable
one. On the one hand, he must attribute to the movement
of Thought, the decay of one principle and mode of social
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life and the triumph of another. On the other hand, he
cannot allow for the possibility of legitimate critical
thought within a given social whole, for this would im-
ply the possibility of a disjuncture between the actual
and the rational. Oddly enough, not only mainstream in-
terpretive theorists but many Marxists as well, who are
among the most staunch opponents of idealism, have ac-
cepted Hegel's conservative notion of philosophy. If
Hegel is incorrect about idealism but correct about the
dynamic nature of thought, however, philosophy always
will do more than reproduce in thought the principles of
an established order of things. As the self-reflection
of an age, philosophy already will have moved beyond
habitual practices and relations. If it concludes its
journey by affirming the principle of these practices and
relations, this affirmation still will be of a different
order from one which is unthinking. But there is nothing
in the nature of self-reflection which insures it will not
take a radical direction instead. Lastly, while mental
journeys never entail practical action, they always have
implications for it. The purely contemplative function
of philosophy is another erroneous notion of idealism
which has found its way into the Marxist camp.
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In the Logic , Hegel claims a relation of pro-
gressive entailment between the categories of (pure)
Being, Nothing and Becoming; and a relation of pro-
gressive entailment between this triad of categories
(which he calls Being) and the first category of the fol-
lowing triad. Determinate Being.
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Hegel states that pure Being is the first lo-gical category, because the thought that "everything
IS" IS the completely indeterminate, unmediated thought.When thinking is to begin
. . . [t]he indeterminate
. . .
IS the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness reachedby abstraction, not the elimination of all definite char-
acter, but the original featurelessness which precedes
all definite character and is the very first of all. And
this we call Being." ( Logic
, p. 125.) That there is
nothing else but Being is true, but is the most empty,
abstract truth. And because it is empty. Being is No-
things "if when we view the whole world we can only~~say
that everything is, and nothing more, we are neglecting
all specialty and instead of absolute plentitude, we
have absolute emptiness." (Logic, p. 128.) This ad-
vance from Being to Nothing Hegel describes as a neces-
sary movement of Thought, and it does seem to me to be
the case that the thought of pure Being is at once the
thought of Nothing.
Hegel next claims that the truth of Being and
Nothing is their unity, and that their unity is Becoming
,
for Becoming involves the attribute of Being and also of
Nothing. This certainly is an illegitimate move, for
two reasons. (1) The transition presupposes, when it is
supposed to prove, the truth of the dialectic (i.e., that
a self and its opposite always are resolved in a higher
unity) . What prevents two categories which are both
opposite and identical from remaining so, except the
prior assumption that there must be a higher unity of
the two? That Being is at once Nothing perhaps intro-
duces the concept of "becoming" in the trite sense that
"becomes" means "is at the same time" or "is transformed
at once into." But I can find nothing in the idea that
Being becomes Nothing in this sense which leads one out
of an eternal "Being becomes Nothing becomes Being" to a
new, higher unity and a more concrete, elaborated cate-
gory. (2) The move is illegitimate because although Be-
coming in the non-trite sense of "becoming something" or
"forming into something" does involve the concepts of
Being (X becomes some being) and Nothing (X had not been
the being it is becoming) , this does not warrant the
statement that Becoming (in this non-trite sense) is
the only unity of Being and Nothing. Their unity might
just as logically be Flux, for example. This second pos-
sible unity calls into question the necessity of the
category of Becoming, and hence the deductive character
of the categories in general. It also undermines the
validity of Hegel's next dialectical transition, from
Becoming to Determinate Being. For, as I have argued.
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Becoming is not the only possible unity of Beina and
Nothing. And there is nothing in the idea of constant
Flux, for example, which entails determinate things
—
quite the contrary.
From the fact that we do know determinate things
about the world, it follows that for us, at least, the
world is not only abstract Being and Nothing. Therefore
Hegel must derive more and more concrete categories
capable of embracing determinacy from the first two, com-
pletely abstract forms of thought. But for Hegel, the
dialectic is not merely the construction by the philoso-
pher of more and more adequate categories to handle a
prior but less articulate knowledge of the determinate
world. Rather, he asserts that these categories move
through internal contradiction, or of themselves
, to more
and more concrete categories. As we have seen above,
this claim is not substantiated in the transition from
Being to Determinate Being. Determinate Being is a unity
of Being and Nothing, but it is not their necessary unity.
Most of the other dialectical transitions (al-
though not all: see Charles Taylor, "The Opening Arguments
of the Phenomenology," in Maclntyre ed . Hegel ) are equally
specious. This is most obvious in the case of the "self-
deduction" of the existential world from the logical cate-
gories as a whole--the lynchpin of the Hegelian metaphy-
sic. The reader who wishes to examine other of Hegel's
transitions for herself might look at the transition from
"cause and effect" to "reciprocity" to "Notion" (Logic,
pp. 215-222) , and the transition from "mechanism" to
"chemism" to "teleology" (Logic, pp. 260-274) , in which
Hegel does show each category to be higher than its pre-
decessor on a continuum of categories expressive of ex-
plicit "self-identity" or freedom, but fails to prove
each category as implicit in and the necessary outcome of
the last.
^^There is also the possibility that this de-
velopment will create the conditions for its own arrest,
regression, or destruction.
8 0Reason in History , p. 35.
^"'"I use the term "critical theory" in the broad
sense, to refer to all contemporary theorists who dis-
tinguish between an appearance and a self-mystifying re-
ality in social life.
8 2 Reason in History
, p
.
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At the heart of Marx's explanation of social life,
IS a paradoxical theory of human action. On the one hand,
he sees human action in highly rationalistic terms. He
looks for its sources inside the web of social practice
and not in external physical causes. He celebrates la-
bor
—
that most significant practice of all--as the mas-
tery of human reason over the blind forces of nature.
Most striking, he anticipates an epoch in which human
beings collectively and self-consciously order all as-
pects of their existence. On the other hand, Marx is
adamant that the explanation of real action does not lie
in the beliefs and purposes of human beings. To the con-
trary, he claims that past and present human action has
been objectively determined, although not by a material
or ideal cause outside itself. The contradiction between
a concept of practice as determined by the rational agency
of its subjects, and an analysis of real practice as au-
thored by human beings but not determined by them, runs
through all of Marx's work from the Manuscripts to Capi-
tal. This contradiction emerges at three critical junc-
tures: in his account of the labor process, in his dis-
cussion of consciousness, and in his method of scientific
explanation. In a vital sense, it provides the creative
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tension for Marx's critique of capital. It also jeopar-
dizes his entire theoretical enterprise. For he can re-
concile his two antithetical notions of action only by
locating the break between them as a break in historical
time. Thus he is forced to read history as the progres-
sion from alienated to unalienated labor, from opaque to
transparent relations, from a society determined by an ob-
jective, hidden logic to one determined by the purposes
of its participants. As we shall see, this reading is
incompatible with Marx's materialism, and is full of other
difficulties as well.
CHAPTER I
THE PRACTICE OF LABOR
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
Marx asserts against Hegel that human beings are fully
natural creatures dependent on an equally natural exter-
nal world for their physical sustenance. They must re-
shape that world to produce what they require to satisfy
their needs, and as they are bodies living in a world of
other bodies, they can do so only through actual prac-
tice. "The fact that man is an embodied
,
living, real,
sentient objective being with natural powers, means that
he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his be-
ing, or that he can only express his being in real, sen-
suous objects."''" But Marx also uses an Hegelian argument
against the "old materialists" when he states that the
natural world transformed by labor expresses the will and
purposes of the human subject. Through labor, man "hu-
manizes" nature by objectifying his reason in it and thus
increasingly frees himself from nature as an uncontrolled
external force. This ability to mold the object in ac-
cordance with self-consciously held purposes distinguished
man from other animals: "The practical construction of an
objective world , the manipulation of inorganic nature, is
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the affirmation of man as a conscious species-being."^
Through production "nature appears as his work and his
3
reality." Society too is produced by man, but it also
produces him, mediating his thought and action so that
the objectification process is never an individually de-
termined one. The double thrust of Marx's position— that
embodied, natural being rather than immanent Spirit is
the substance of the real world, and that human beings
transform that world through purposive, socially consti-
tuted action--is repeated in Theses . Here he goes on to
define humans as historical "ensembles" of social rela-
4tions
.
The implications of the claim that action is so-
cially constituted surface in The German Ideology . Here
Marx reiterates the priority of real, purposive human
action in the shaping of the objective world. But for
the first time, he uses the concept of the mode of pro-
duction to describe the set of historically specific, so-
cially determined practices through which the human sub-
ject transforms the natural object and in conjunction with
which she produces her needs, ideas and social relations.
The concept entails that the production of social life
occurs within limitations independent of the subject's
will, for she must produce her life in the company of
other subjects and upon a material and ideational founda-
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tion inherited from past generations. Three important
points follow. First, the inherently historical relation
of subject to object means that that relation cannot be
grasped adequately in philosophical, universalis tic terms.
Second, the social production of social life means that
human beings are "the actors and authors of their own
drama" ^ in a way in which Hegel's individual subjects
were not. But it also suggests that an explanation of
action in terms of the actor's own reasons and purposes
is an insufficient one, as neither purposes nor action
can be understood apart from a web of purposes and ac-
tions which does not originate with the individual actor.
Third, it is logically possible that the particular sub-
ject--because she is still a particular subject—m.ay not
experience herself in her real connection to the social
world. Thus she may help author the drama of social life
without understanding the larger story she is writing;
and she may act intentionally without understanding the
real social sources of her intentions and beliefs. From
The German Ideology onwards, Marx argues that as social
authors, persons are not self-conscious, in that they do
not plan, understand, or see as their own creation the
totality of social practice. As social actors, persons
are not self-conscious, in that they are, so to speak,
attached to schedules of purposes and actions. These
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schedules form a larger design which ultimately explains
but is not explicable in terms of the purposes helping to
compose it. Marx insists, however, that while action al-
ways will be socially constituted, the fact that it is
determined by objective structure outside the control of
its human authors is the result of historically specific
social arrangements and not part of the human condition.
He therefore is forced to make the difficult argument that
"bearers" of purposes and actions can become, under dif-
ferent conditions, self-conscious human agents.
In the writings of the 1840s, Marx attempts to
resolve the tension between objectively determined action
and real human agency through the motif of alienation.
Although he speaks briefly of alienation in pre-capitalist
societies, his basic analysis of the separation and in-
version of subject and object through labor is specific
to capitalism. Capital sunders the natural link between
laboring subject and labored object in such a way that
the object gains independence and control of the subject.
The subject becomes a mere means to the production of
commodities; and his objectified labor confronts him as
capital, a hostile being which dominates him, controls
his work and destroys its expressive quality, and in vari-
ous ways separates him from his social self. This inver-
sion of productive practice, whereby the laboring subject
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does not determine his own productive activity, however,
finds its "definitive resolution" beyond the boundaries
of capitalism. Finally gaining a recognition of its own
debasement and dehumanization
, labor revolts against the
entire system of capital, and destroys the relation be-
tween itself and its opposite. Under communism, the la-
borer will reclaim his essence as purpose agent. He ap-
propriates the productive forces which had stood opposed
to him and regulates production to fulfill his needs, ex-
ercise his skills, and objectify his purposes in nature.
He knows himself as an inherently social being and is
capable of explicitly communal relations with other sub-
jects. Together these subjects control all "natural pre-
mises" of production and are the self-conscious authors
7
of their social life. This unification of subject and
object, however, is not equivalent to the "natural unity"
which prevails under primitive communism, before the his-
torical emergence of the division of labor. For the new
relationship is mediated by two innovations bequeathed by
capitalism: a vast accumulation of the means of labor
(knowledge, technique, tools, machinery) on the one hand,
and a rational rather than mystical understanding of na-
Q
ture on the other.
It often is said that the later Marx rejects all
"Hegelian" concern with human subjectivity and intention-
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ality, and presents a thoroughly objectivist theory of
history and capital. Nothing can be further from the
truth. The mature Marx has a newly rich appreciation of
history and knowledge of bourgeois productive practice.
But he still holds to the same paradoxical view of action
as socially constituted, purposive, and potentially ra-
tional; yet objectively determined, although not by ma-
terial causes external to practice itself.
The Grundrisse meticulously shows how the produc-
tive process cannot be divorced even analytically from the
social relations in which persons stand to one another.
Marx peels away the physical, immediately observable qual-
ities of human subject, object and productive activity to
expose a complex social constitution of each. He repeats
his description of the individual as "the sum of inter-
relations, the relations within which these individuals
Q
stand." He describes the object of labor as an expres-
sion of the productive relations between wage-labor and
capital. These relations do not show themselves on the
physical surface of the product, which looks the same,
Marx notes, whether it has been made by an independent
peasant or a wage- laborer . The most important discovery
that he makes in his search beneath the physique of the
object, is that capital itself is objectified labor in a
specific relation to living labor. It is not simply a
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material object, and certainly not a material object with
self-multiplying capacities. In turn, the process of
capitalist production is not determined by the development
of material forces of production, but by the logic of the
relation between capital and wage-labor, from which follow
advances in technology, mechanization, and so on. In
fact, according to Marx, the most significant result of
the entire process of capital is the reproduction of the
social relations comprising it."^^
In the Grundrisse
, Marx also celebrates the labor
process as the means by which human reason expresses it-
self in the objective world. He describes the labored
object as the ob jectif ication of reason even— indeed,
particularly--when he is speaking of fixed capital, which
appears as an independent, simply material agent in capi-
talist production.
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, rail-
ways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc.
These are products of human industry; natural ma-
terial transformed into organs of the human will
over nature, or of human participation in nature.
They are organs of the human brain, created by
the human hand ; the power of knowledge , objecti-
fied. The development of fixed capital indicates
to what degree general social knowledge has be-
come a direct force of production , and to what de-
gree, hence , the conditions of social life itself
have come under the control of the general in-
tellect and been transformed in accordance with
it
.
It is in the first volume of Capital , however, that Marx
speaks most eloquently of the immanent rationality of the
106
labor process, through which the human subject refashions
the natural world by means of her developing powers and
in accordance with her needs, wants, and chosen ends.
Marx's lengthy celebration of labor as purposive, ration-
al and historical— rather than instinctual, blind, and
recurrent— has been quoted too often to bear repeating
12here. But one should note that this philosophical no-
tion of labor as a process by which the human laborer ob-
jectifies herself, is central to Marx's economic analysis
of capital. His theory of the exploitation of wage-labor
is contingent upon it, for the value of the commodity,
which holds the secret of exploitation, is entirely a
function of the fact that the commodity is objectified
labor, or "crystallized labor-time."
While the mature Marx's notion of the practical re-
lation of subject and object is thus not a physicalist one,
and entails a concept of labor as purposive and socially
mediated, it is not the case that he begins with a study of
intentionality and intersubjective meaning to answer the
question, "What are people doing in bourgeois society?"
Throughout the nine hundred pages of the Grundrisse he
barely touches on issues of consciousness, and with some
crucial exceptions the same is true of Capital . Instead,
he probes the abstract "moments" of the concept of capital,
or to put it otherwise, he uncovers the logical structure
of the system of capitalist production. As he states in
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Capital, he deals with individuals and their purposes
"only insofar as they are the personifications of economic
categories, embodiments of particular class relations and
class interests. "^^ At a later point we shall examine thi:
method of analysis, which is as little interpretive as it
is empirical. For now, let us note that Marx again uses
the theme of alienation and inversion to show how social
practice is determined by forces other than the agency of
its participants. And he again locates the break between
alienated and unalienated action in the juncture between
capitalist and pre-capitalist society, and between capital
ism and communism.
In the Grundrisse
, Marx finds an "immediate iden-
tity" of subject and object in systems of communal and
small free landed property which preceded the rise of
capitalism. Here the subject enjoyed a "natural unity"
with the land and viewed himself and other subjects as
masters of the productive process. In the "artificial"
craft and guild communities the subject had direct pro-
prietorship in and control over his instruments of labor,
and exercised a single skill which nonetheless allowed
him to develop both mental and bodily faculties. Even
the slave and serf were united with the objective condi-
tions of labor, if only because they were treated as part
of them. The immediate subject/object unity is described
in Capital as the system of private property based on the
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labor of the owner, in which the independent peasant or
artison was "fused together" with the objective conditions
of his labor. Primitive capital accumulation spelled the
forcible expropriation of the private property of the pro-
ducer, the concentration of the scattered means of produc-
tion in a few hands, and the domination of the laborer by
the objective conditions of labor in the form of alien
capital. Through an exchange in which wage-labor yields
its creative, value-multiplying capacity to capital and
receives in return its value as a fixed magnitude (the
"secret" of capital)
,
living labor re-affirms itself as a
mere moment of capital and the means to its enrichment.
Thus does labor's own result become "objectified labour
14
as mastery, command over living labour." The inversion
of the laborer into the means for the increase of capital,
and the inversion of the objective conditions and pro-
duct of labor into an alien subject controlling the pro-
ductive process, is reflected in every facet of the rela-
tion between wage-labor and capital. Their own associa-
tion at the workplace, for example, appears to workers as
an association external to them, dictated by capital and
part of its productive power. The means of production,
far from being the mere "material of his own intelligent
productive activity, "^^ subjugate and exploit the laborer.
The system of capitalist manufacture breaks up his skill
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altogether and turns him into its "conscious organ." The
social growth of knowledge underlying every advance in
technology, stands against the worker as an attribute of
fixed capital. And as living labor creates greater and
greater quantities of surplus product, "the objective
conditions of labour assume an evermore colossal indepen-
dence
. . . social wealth confronts labour in more power-
ful portions as an alien and dominant power. ""'"^
Because wage- laborers are the authors of produc-
tive practice without being its controlling agents, Marx
explains that practice not in terms of the intentionality
of its participants, but in terms of its objective, inner
logic. The crucial question remains: v/hat precisely is
the intersection between the intentionality of individual
actions in capitalist society and the logic of those ac-
tions as a whole? The question is especially complicated
because Marx claims that intentional action not only main
tains the capital-wage labor relation but is also a neces
sary means to its collapse. The texts of the Grundrisse
and Capital suggest three distinct intersections. First,
the intentional acts of individuals may flow from and
directly express the structure of the capital-wage labor
relation. The worker who seeks to acquire exchange value
through the sale of her labor power provides an obvious
case in point. Her action is a function of a system of
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production in which she is dependent upon capital for
the conditions of her labor, and in which exchange value
is the universal mediator between individuals and the use
values they create. In this way, the intentional action
by which she sells her labor-power reflects the "dull
1 7compulsion of economic relations." Far more striking,
however, is Marx's insistence that the capitalist's con-
stant urge to increase value is likewise structurally de-
termined (and thus is distinguished from the "merely idio-
syncratic" greed of the miser) . It is not that one can
predict an individual capitalist's thought and action on
the basis of abstract economic categories. Intentional
actions reflecting the dynamic of those categories are
not exhaustive of actions in bourgeois society; an indi-
vidual, for example, may choose to dissipate his capital
on personal luxuries, or may shorten the work-day in his
factory for the benefit of his employees. But only inso-
far as his aim is not the enjoyment of use-value or the
well-being of his workers but rather "the appropriation
1
8
of ever more and more welath in the abstract," does
he act as "the personification of capital," and this fact
is deducible from the structure of capitalist produc-
tion. '''^ The individual, in sum, may have a variety of
intentions extraneous or even antithetical to this struc-
ture. But he functions as a capitalist only insofar as
Ill
he acts with the sole purpose of expanding value. And
insofar as he functions as a capitalist, the inner logic
of the capital-wage-labor relation determines his action,
whether it be the raising of labor's productivity, the
extension of capital, or the investment in new technology.
Such action this is purposive but not self-explanatory.
Nor does it provide the final locus of explanation for
capitalist practice as a whole.
The second intersection is one in which the inten-
tional action of individual subjects flows from the logic
of the capital-wage-labor relation but seems discordant
with it. When the worker sells her labor-power to the
capitalist for an equivalent in wages, for example, it is
clear that she typically intends to do so. It is equally
clear that the organization of production requires that
she do so. It is not the case that she intends what Marx
reveals to be the result of her action: that she will
produce independent value which will confront her as capi-
talist, that "labour will create alien property and pro-
20
party will command alien labour," and this to an ever
increasing extent. The process of obfuscation by which
the purposes and beliefs of the worker do not mesh with,
but equally do not comprehend, the consequences of her
action,^''" is however a product of the structure of pro-
duction itself. For these purposes and beliefs are con-
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gruent with the surface relations of that structure, which
mystify and hence help perpetuate the depth relations in
a way we shall explore later.
Marx briefly but most significantly mentions a
third relation between intentional action and the struc-
ture of productive practice as a whole. Certain actions
flow from the latter but break with it. In their most
developed form, they are attempts to undermine the entire
system of bourgeois production, and rest upon an under-
standing of that system which penetrates to its hidden
dynamic
.
The recognition of the products as its [wage-
labour's] own, and the judgement that its se-
paration from the conditions of its realization
is improper-- forcibly imposed--is an enormous
[advance in-ed.] awareness, itself the product
of the mode of production resting on capital,
and as much the knell to its doom as, with the
slave's awareness that he cannot be the pro-
perty of another
,
with his consciousness of him-
self as a person, the existence of slavery be-
comes a merely artificial, vegetative existence,
and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of
production
.
The stage of alienation which capital represents, then,
is a transitory one:
[The] process of inversion is a merely historical
necessity . . . for the development of the forces
of production solely from a specific historic de-
parture . . . but in no way an absolute necessity
of production; rather, a vanishing one . . .
The mature Marx explains the break-down of capitalist pro-
duction primarily in terms of its objective contradic-
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tions. But he claims that such contradictions also ge-
nerate the conditions for revolutionary consciousness on
the part of the working-class. Such revolutionary con-
sciousness foreshadows the triumph of self-conscious,
rational action over action determined by a system of
production opaque to its participants. Grasping its real
relation to capital, the proletariat will destroy the
entire exploitative system of production and create a new
social order in which living labor has full control over
its own productive activity. In this communist society,
Marx believes that actors will have a scientific relation
to nature and transparent relationships with one another.
They will determine and understand fully what they are
doing, and barring the fortuitous event, the consequences
of their actions always will mesh with their intentions.
There are enormous philosophical, to say nothing
of political, difficulties in a theory which entails a
concept of action as self-consciously determined by its
authors as the same time that it describes actual human
action as objectively determined and deeply mystified.
We have seen that in both his early and later writings,
Marx attempts to resolve these difficulties by locating
in historical time the disjuncture between the two types
of action. He reads history not, of course, as a
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straightforward progression towards rational social ac-
tion; but as the evolution of society from a stage of
primitive communism or independent producer-ownership,
through the separation and inversion of subject and ob-
ject under capitalism, to the redemptive unity of human
beings and nature in industrial communism. It is quite
plain that this resolution has its philosophical support
in Hegelian idealism. Marx's triadic vision of social
practice is the exact analogue of the Hegelian logic, in
which the immediate, unreflective unity of subject and
object is shattered as the subject undergoes separation
and alienation from itself, and by means of this very
separation reaches a higher unity mediated by self-
conscious reason. Hegel's tenet that separation is the
necessary condition of self-conscious unity is echoed in
Marx's belief that the historical emergence of human be-
ings as self-determining subjects is dependent upon the
economic and scientific advances made by capitalism.
That the destruction of primitive communism and the even
tual rise of capitalism are not contingent events, and
that the capitalist mode of production is determined by
the need which the fully rational communist man as impli
cit historical subject has for it, are but short next
theoretical steps. It is never clear that Marx does not
take them. His early description of communism bears the
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unfortunate marks of an historical conclusion, in which
laboring subjects as "united individuals" enjoy full
self-retrieval, complete rational control over the objec-
tification process, and total transparency in their social
relations. The emergence of productive practice as ra-
tional, self-expressive and explicitly social, is the de-
noument of his mature theory of capital as well. He de-
scribes the system of wage-labor and capital as "the last
form of servitude assumed by human activity ." ^'^ The so-
ciety which is to take its place is free of fundamental
tensions, both among human beings and betv;een humans and
nature. It re-establishes the living laborer as the true
subject of production, whose work becomes "self-
realization, ob jectif ication of the subject, hence real
2 5freedom." In cooperation with other subjects, she or-
ganizes the labor process "rationally," according to a
"settled plan, " so that all subjects share equally in
labor and in the development of their "species capabili-
ties."
One easily can understand how Marx, deeply com-
mitted to the liberation of the working-class, was tempted
to read history as a plot and the realization of freedom
as its ending (or "real beginning"). But for a material-
ist who rejects the validity of trans-historical Ideas,
this is the temptation of strictly forbidden fruit. Given
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his own assumptions about the nature of social practice,
Marx legitimately might argue that communist society will
overcome the worst problems of economic scarcity and the
physical and psychological miseries inherent in class
exploitation. But the surfacing of new problems and
struggles is the one certainty a dialectical material-
ist can predict. It cannot be guaranteed in advance,
furthermore, that these struggles will be "non-
antagonistic." The Grundrisse and Capital no less than
the Manuscripts ignore the seeds of divisiveness and bru-
tality which lie elsewhere than in the production sphere.
Certainly a bitter struggle over the content of social
life itself is acutely possible once the production of
society is made a public and self-conscious affair. We
might speculate that antagonisms in communist society
would emerge between administrative center and local
communities or workplaces; party leadership and rank and
file; male and female; the pressure towards universalism
and ethnic identification. These oppositions and others
unthinkable at present would generate new reasons for
opacity in social relations. Their resolution in turn
might entail new standards of self-consciousness which
the given social order cannot fulfill. Ironically, Marx's
optimistic rationalism (if the prospect of a fully har-
monious society is cause for optimism) is founded on this
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curious combination: an idealist's vision of a final
"identity" of subject and object, and a materialist's
faith in the limited sources of social conflict.
CHAPTER II
THE DETERMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The other side of Marx's vision of a future in
which action is fully transparent to its authors, is a
past and present in which action is fully opaque. Perhaps
nowhere has Marx been more vulnerable to attack than in
his account of consciousness in general and mystified con-
sciousness in particular. However, this account is both
more complex and more obscure than most of his critics
acknowledge. First of all, Marx does not believe con-
sciousness to be an invalid hypothesis, or an unimportant
factor in social life. Yet he never produces a sophis-
ticated, prolonged analysis of class consciousness to
match his mature analysis of the objective logic of capi-
talist production. One thus is forced back to discus-
sions of mind one suspects are as cursory and blunted in
comparison to what he would have said had he explored the
subject in depth, as is his early analysis of capitalist
production in comparison to that in the Grundrisse and
Capital . Second, these discussions are cursory enough to
be congenial to many conflicting interpretations, and in-
consistent enough that each interpretation is open to
doubt. And third, the interpretation most persuasive for
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scholars today would not be compelling for audiences in
Marx's own time.
Modern readers tend to find in Marx's insistence
that all ideas are determined by material life, a posi-
tivism akin to that which forms the backdrop to their
own reflections. However, Marx constructed his argument
with his own contemporaries in mind, and these contempo-
raries thought in ways grossly at odds with the beliefs
that only physically observable things are real, and only
physically observable facts susceptible to being known.
His claims about the relation of "thought" to "being" take
on a new meaning once one situates them against the fan-
tastical intellectual landscape of 19th century German
philosophy, and if one is to understand what he is saying,
one must appreciate the turns and emphases of his argu-
2 6
ment as they must have been appreciated by his own peers.
Although mechanistic materialism, that primitive
27
positivism, was by no means unheard of at the time, the
German tradition which confronted Marx was so strongly
idealist that it had all but lost the connection between
thought and the embodied persons doing the thinking. He-
gel, the greatest of all idealists, created a vast philo-
sophical system around the logical and ontological pri-
ority of Abstract Thought. But Marx reserved his sharpest
rebukes for the Young "left" Hegelians, who purported to
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abandon Hegel's metaphysic in order to study real human
practice. In fact, Marx charged, they unwittingly con-
tinued to follow Hegel in treating social events as a
function of logically prior ideational ones, and history
as the maturation process of mind. When mulling over so-
cial change, they talked only of emergent categories and
principles. When investigating economic relations, they
spoke of the "bourgeoisie" as a logical form generating
bourgeois particulars out of itself. They saw contradic-
tions in society in terms of contradictions between ab-
stract categories of "individuality" and "totality" which
ought to be reconciled so that reason might prevail in
social life. In short, the technique of these anti-
Hegelian critics came straight from Hegel: "An abstrac-
tion is made from a fact; then it is declared that the
fact is based upon the abstraction. That is how to pro-
ceed if you want to appear German, profound, and specula-
,,28tive
.
In what today is considered one of Marx's most
mechanistic works. The German Ideology , Marx and Engels
maliciously quote one critical philosopher, who is prais-
ing the accomplishments of two others:
Feuerbach destroyed the religious illusion, the
theoretical abstraction, the God-Man, while
Hess annihilates the political illusion, the ab-
straction of his wealth, of his activity; that
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is, annihilates wealth. It was the work of Hess
which freed Man from the last of the forces ex-
ternal to him . . .29
It was to counter such beliefs in the practical powers of
criticism, such confusions of putatively ideational phe-
nomena like God with phenomena existing apart from (al-
though not independent of) ideas about them like wealth,
and such abstractions of generic Man from human beings
living in concrete social and historical circumstances,
that Marx waged his theoretical battle against idealism.
It is, in turn, in the context of this battle that his
statements about consciousness must be set. His first
and most general point--that consciousness is solely the
30
attribute of "real, living individuals," that it is no-
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thing but "conscious existence" --may seem true but
trite until one remembers the way in which German ideal-
ism severed the link between embodied human beings and
the ideas they have. The care Marx takes here to root
mind in materially existing persons, so that consciousness
is always an attribute of humans "living in a real, ob-
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jective world and determined by that world," is an ob-
vious first sally against the view that ideas have a life
autonomous of human practice.
At the same time, the assertion that ideas are
determined by and explicable only in terms of practical
life raises several conceptual questions. What exactly
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does Marx mean by "practical life," and what strength
does he mean to give to "determine?" Marx gives no ex-
plicit answers here. But we have seen (see Chapter I)
that both in his early and later writings he views human
action as inherently purposive, and purposes as social
and historical. If he is to be consistent with this con-
cept of action, he cannot take "practice" here to mean
patterns of human matter in motion. Human practice must
be distinguishable from the mechanical movements of in-
animate objects and the instinctual behavior of other
animals, in that it expresses the actors' socially and
historically specific purposes and beliefs, although
these purposes and beliefs are not necessarily rational
in Marx's sense of the term. And if practice is a com-
plex of thought and bodily movement, the determination of
ideas by practical life cannot be an instance of "deter-
mination" in the classical causal sense, where an effect
is separate in time and space from its cause. Rather, it
must be that ideas are determined by and explicable in
terms of practical life because they are necessarily in-
ternal, and not logically prior, to it. Conversely,
practice cannot be understood without reference to the
beliefs and intentions which inform it. To recognize
that ideas are internal to practice rather than external
to a set of purely physical movements which cause them.
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of course, is only a preliminary though imperative step
in the explanation of ideas and the practices in which
they are embodied. VJhy various modes of thought and prac-
tice characterize a given form of social life, and why
new ideas and actions emerge out of old ones, are questions
still to be answered.
To understand a point which Marx will make against
critical philosophy, we must distinguish the ideas which
inform "everyday" practice from ideas about modes of
thought and practice (as well as about modes of instinc-
tual and mechanical behavior) , or theory . Forming, sys-
tematizing, and articulating theoretical ideas is itself
a practice, distinctive in that its entire point is the
construction of ideas. This is not to say, of course,
that theorizing, like all thinking, is not accompanied by
physical changes in the brain, or that the objectifica-
tion of theory does not involve the physical movements
necessary to speaking and writing. Indeed, precisely be-
cause theorizing is a practice--in that its form is go-
verned by social rules and its content can be goven a
public, external reality--it is possible to theorize
about it. Marx does exactly this (which is not to say
that he does it persuasively) when he remarks that the
demise of 17th century metaphysics can be explained by
the emergence of French materialism, which represented
125
matter as the sole substance of the world and ideas a
mechanical motions, only if French materialism is ex-
plained by
the practical nature of French life at that time.
This life was turned to the immediate present,
to worldly enjoyment and worldly interests, to
the earthly world. Its anti- theological , anti-
metaphysical, materialist practice demanded cor-
responding anti-theological, anti-metaphysical,
materialist theories. Metaphysics had in prac -
tice lost all credit.
Here it is obvious, first of all, that Marx includes in
the notion of practical life, ideas, norms and purposes:
specifically, worldly interests, values and wants in-
formed that everyday actions of the French. Second, Marx
believes French materialist theory to be rooted in every-
day practical life, not as the set of ideas directly ex-
pressed in it, but as a second-order practice hinging on
the first. Everyday practice, in other words, generates
a theoretical practice which tallies with it and helps
justify it.
To combat the idea that theoretical practice of
itself transforms other practices, Marx draws a strict
line between "occurrences" in the realm of thought, in-
cluding theoretical and critical thought, and occurrences
in relations between objective beings. He berates the
Young Hegelians for assuming that to undermine the prin-
ciple or rationale of a practice through criticism is
ipso facto to destroy the actual practice. "If society
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had to free itself only from the categories of having and
not having, how easy would the 'overcoming' and 'aboli-
tion' of those categories be.""^"^ But "property, capital,
money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of
the brain but very practical, very objective products
. . .
therefore they must be abolished in a practical,
3 5objective way ..." The necessary although not suffi-
cient condition for a thought-occurrence to become an
actual one, barring the fortuitous coincidence, is that
the thought be expressed in a relevant action, which en-
tails some bodily movement vis a vis other bodies in the
world. Two points must be kept in mind. First, Marx is
not saying that thought is irrelevant to practice, nor
critical thought to revolutionary practice. But a trans-
formation of thought can have no impact on the world out-
side the thinker, if everyday practice goes on exactly
3 ft
as before. Second, he is not claiming that phenomena
which are purely ideational (such as God, according to
Marx) will not disappear v/hen all thoughts of them do so.
However, he does imply that the philosophical critique
of a purely ideational or "pseudo" being (a) is not equi-
valent to the destruction of that idea in the minds of
other people; (b) is not equivalent to the practical de-
struction of the web of material accoutrements and prac-
tices which may have arisen to "service" the idea (in the
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case of the idea of God: priests, churches, prayerbooks,
rituals, etc.); and (c) typically will not result in the
destruction of that idea in the minds of other people,
if the idea also is supported by everyday practices which
appear to have no connection to it. The Young Hegelians
believed that "illusions of consciousness" to which hu-
mans ascribe an objective existence are the "real chains
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of man." Marx replies that these are only "phrases" of
3 8the "real, existing world." He seeks the ultimate ex-
planation of "mental phantoms" and the subsidiary prac-
tices which congeal around them, in a set of apparently
separate practices. To the distinction between theoreti-
cal and everyday practice, then, we must add another:
within everyday practice, a distinction between religious
belief and practice on the one hand, and on the other,
practices whose own objects are not pseudo-beings but
which provoke the need for a belief in them. Marx finds
the most significant of these latter practices to be
economic ones, and it is here that he will look for "real
39
chains."
Once upon a time an honest fellow had the idea
that men were drowned in water only because they
were possessed with the idea of gravity. If
they were to knock this idea out of their heads
. . .
they would be sublimely proof against any
danger from, water.
Through this parody of the project of critical
philosophy, Marx neatly underlines the distinction betwen
128
illusions of consciousness and objective constraints. He
also teeters on the edge of a fundamental error which he
never is quite out of danger of making. A natural object
does not change when we simply change our beliefs about
it, because our ideas about the natural world do not en-
ter into its constitution. The "objects" of the social
world, however, are practices and relations, which as we
have seen are made partly of the norms, ideas, and pur-
poses which hum.an actors express in them. Of course, if
a philosopher writing a paper at her desk undermines the
concept of authority-- the idea that there are some legi-
timate uses of power which some persons can wield over
others--this does not mean that actors will not respect
the authority of policemen or employers in their everyday
practice. But if these actors themselves were to reject
the idea of authority, they would be proof against sub-
mitting to it. And this is true because relations of
authority are constituted in part by the inter-subjective
belief among participants in those relations that some
uses of pov7er are legitimate and warrant submission. How-
ever, beliefs and purposes do not entirely constitute so-
cial practice, which necessarily entails bodily movement
in the world of objects. Two points follow which corres-
pond to Marx's complaint against the Young Hegelians.
First, the destruction of the idea of authority in every-
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day life does not mean that persons will not be forced
to submit to orders, although it does mean that those
orders will not be invested with a legitimacy which pro-
tects the position of the order-giver. Second, actual
practices may serve to inhibit the destruction of the
idea of authority in everyday life. Some of these prac-
tices directly express that idea (for example, relations
between employer and employee) , some directly support
that idea (education and socialization practices) , and
some indirectly support that idea. To the set of prac-
tices which Marx asserts indirectly supports all the
ideas and practices comprising a form of social life, and
to the second stage of his argument against the idealist
theory of consciousness, we now must turn.
In The German Ideology , Marx declares with new
specificity that the material practice of real human be-
ings holds the key to the explanation of their ideas and
indeed of their entire form of social life. Marx uses
this critical term "material" in two related but not iden-
tical ways. That something is material in the broader
sense of the term means that it is situated within and
belongs to the world of extended objects and their move-
ments. This first sense of "material" overlaps the con-
cept "practical life." Every practice is a material one
in this sense, and ideas have no material reality (al-
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though they have a reality as ideas) unless they can be
and until they are embodied in practice. The explanatory
primacy of material practice in turn means that ideas are
not autonomous of or logically prior to practical life.
Depending on ones reading of Marx's concept of practice,
ideas either are caused by material practice which itself
is not expressive of ideas; or are generated within and
circumscribed by material practice which itself is ex-
pressive of ideas. Most of the time, however, Marx uses
the term "material" in a second, narrower sense, to refer
to the specific practices which pertain to the physical
life-process of human beings as inclusively natural,
bodily, historical and social creatures. These fundamen-
tal practices of human life Marx identifies as: the pro-
duction of the means to satisfy the life-sustaining needs
of the body; the production of new needs; the reproduction
of human beings; and the form of social cooperation in-
volved in these three activities. What is evident from
even a cursory glance at these material practices is that,
while they pertain directly, although not exclusively, to
the physical sustenance of human life, they are not com-
prehensible simply as sets of physical movements. That
the activity of material production is expressive of pur-
poses, knowledge, and indeed the development of the human
intellect, is a fact Marx celebrates from the Manuscripts
131
to Capital
.
The production of new needs, which marks the
advent of history and culture, refers directly to trans-
formations of consciousness, although these transforma-
tions do not occur in isolation from actual practice.
One perhaps can imagine reproduction to have been at some
point a simple instinctual act. But this point is out-
side of history, for Marx sees sexual activity as the
basis of the first social relation, and he believes that
social relations entail a reflexive consciousness on the
part of each participant: a concept of the self, the
other, and the relation between the two, and so the medi-
ation of language, thought, and culture. "Where there
exists a relationship, it exists for me; the animal has
41
no 'relations' v;ith anything ..." Reproductive rela-
tions in actual fact express some of the most complex
4 2ideas and emotions of all: affection, resentment, obli-
V. X. ^ 4 3gation, guilt, respect, contempt--to name but a tew.
If ideas are internal to all social relations, social co-
operation— the fourth aspect of material life—cannot be
a mechanical or instinctual phenomenon. And indeed, when
we speak of cooperation, we do not simply mean the combi-
nation of bodily movements, but also a set of beliefs and
purposes which persons have toward one another: ideas of
sympathy and trust, norms of authority, contract, or ob-
ligation, a knowledge of the purposes for which they are
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combining, and so on. One must keep in mind the internal
connection of ideas to production and cooperation in par-
ticular when Marx states that "the 'history of humanity'
must always be studied and treated in relation to the
history of industry and exchange. "^^ It would be curious
if one were to take him to mean that the "history of hu-
manity" must be studied in relation to certain patterns
of physical movements in time and space. It would not
be curious (which is not to say that Marx would be cor-
rect) to take him to mean that the history of human beings
and the host of practices in which they engage cannot be
understood apart from the history of one of the most fun-
damental thought-movement complexes of all: material pro-
duction .
Whether or not Marx's own intentions were curious
is a more delicate question. He is as unforthright here
about where or not he means to include forms of conscious-
ness within "material praceice" as he was with the earlier
concept of practice per se."^^ This lack of clarity, as
we shall see, complicates the question of the precise
connection between material production and politics, art,
morality, and all other components of what Hegel had
called "ethical life." On one point Marx is quite clear:
material practice in its narrow sense is the key to the
explanation of the rest of any social whole. Marx's
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hierarchy of significant subject-object relations is al-
most directly opposite to Hegel's, for whom the various
levels of ethical life, climaxing in art, religion, and
philosophy, not only mediate the lower levels but are
their truth or end. For Marx, the most telling truth is
found in the way actual individuals "are effective, pro-
duce materially, and are active under definite material
limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of
46their will." Out of this primary level of practice
evolves, not as its telos but as its elaborations, poli-
tics, morality, art, law, philosophy and religion. What
Marx sees as the exact relationship between production
and other facets of social life is a more difficult ques-
tion. He states that legal and political relations do
not develop autonomously or as the result of the univer-
sal development of mind, but "have their roots" in the
4 7
material conditions of social life. The mode of pro-
duction "conditions" social structure, politics, etc.
The activities required for the physical sustenance of
life are the "base" of a social whole; politics, philo-
4 8
sophy and law its "superstructure." Now, if "material
practice," "material production," and "base" connote only
patterns of behavior , Marx's distinction between material
production and politics et al . is one between patterns of
bodily movement and forms of consciousness, for he speaks
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of law, morality and so on most often as "principles."
The connection between material production and law, etc.,
given the explanatory primacy of the former, will be me-
chanical: in some way, patterns of bodily movement which
produce food, shelter and clothing, emit relevant sets of
political, religious, and artistic ideas with which these
bodies "think." If "material production" instead connotes
bodily movements expressive of ideas, then the distinction
between production and politics et al . should be one be-
tween different kinds of thought-movement complexes, spe-
cifically between those directly concerned with sustaining
the life-process and those which are not. The connection
between the two should be more intricate than a mechani-
cal one. Political, religious, moral, and artistic prin-
ciples will be embedded in practices within a form of
life whose ultimate shape is determined not by the Idea
of Reason but by the practices necessary for the physi-
cal sustenance of life. But because both productive and
political et al . practices are intentional and expressive
of beliefs and norms, these ideas not only must be ex-
plained by reference to the entire structure of practices
but also must help explain it. Further, political, moral
and religious principles and practices will mediate the
fundamental material practices. For while a given form
of life may delineate different spheres for different
practices, no society thus far in history has been able
to compartmentalize completely human experience. So, for
example, moral modes of thought and action (whose speci-
fic content depends upon the form of life in which they
occur) may inform the relations between husband and wife,
or between producer and controller of the means of pro-
duction .
Although Marx never takes a clear position on the
49 . . .issue. It IS in truth as difficult to imagine at least
politics, art, law and morality as pure thought, as it is
to imagine material production and reproduction as pure
matter. The "products" of "ethical life" are not ma-
terial things capable of sustaining bodily needs. But
except in the cases of philosophy and, according to Marx,
religion, where the defining relation is not between hu-
man and human or human and nature, but between human and
idea, they nonetheless entail bodily movement in the
world. One can do theory or be religious entirely in
ones head, although this is not usual. But being poli-
tical, artistic, moral or lawful necessitates acting in
the world. In contrast to material production, philosophy
and art, however, there are no products of politics and
morality beyond the practices of them.
CHAPTER III
IDEOLOGY AND MYSTIFICATION
That "[t]he ruling ideas of each age have ever
been the ideas of its ruling class, "^^ and that these
ideas serve to mystify the social relations of produc-
tion, complicates the question of the relation of ideas
to material existence. Marx's earliest analysis of my-
stification describes it as a process whereby the ma-
terial conditions of an epoch are reflected in its domi-
nant ideas. This analysis re-appears in the Preface to
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and
in Capital .
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas. . . . The ruling ideas are
nothing more than the ideal expression of the
dominant material relations, the dominant ma-
terial relations grasped as ideas.
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain,
i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an
independent subject, is the demiurges of the
real" world, and the real world is only the ex-
ternal, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me,
on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than
the material world reflected by the human mind
and translated into forms of thought. ^2
If by "ideas" and "ideal" Marx means simply "ideas" or
consciousness per se , the sense of both passages is that
the ideas characteristic of a form of social life simply
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and mechanically reflect or picture the "raw-matter" of
that life, specifically t:he raw-matter of its productive
practice. This sense is hi<)hly unsatisfactory, and not
only because, as Hegel pointed out long before, the only
thing the mind can reflect from raw-sense data are raw
and unspeakable sense-impressions. More to the point, a
picture theory oF ideas cannot capture the distinction
between appearance and reality which the concept of my-
stification requires. If minds were mirrors of material
reality, they could never mis-understand it. They would
draw from the simple fact of exploitative feudal produc-
tive practice, for example, the simple idea of exploita-
tion, and not the dense web of beliefs concerning na-
tural hierarchy, traditional rights and obligations, sin
and salvation, loyalty and chivalry, which helped to
mystify as well as constitute feudal social relations.
Further, if minds were mirrors of material reality, it
would make no sense to speak of practices which conceal
their own nature. One could not, then, make a distinc-
tion between the surface of capitalist productive rela-
tions and their hidden reality.
However, one can interpret Marx's reflection
theory in a second way, if one takes him to be using the
term "ideal" as his idealist contemporaries most often
used it: to mean not merely subjective thoughts in the
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heads of individuals or intersub jective ideas marking a
shared way of life, but also objective Ideas which mani-
fest themselves through human practice. The sense of the
passage is then that the ideas of the ruling class are
the characteristic ideas of every epoch, and these are
nothing more than the reification of dominant material
relations as universal truths or objective Ideas. Every
ruling class, that is, idealizes (with degrees of com-
plexity) its modal forms of practice. In a stable so-
cial order, all major classes will share these ideals.
This second interpretation has the advantage that it en-
tails an appearance/reality distinction. Reflection be-
comes a process by which consciousness transforms his-
torically limited social relations into universal, eter-
nal or immanent truths. This interpretation also does
not presuppose a mechanical separation of consciousness
from material reality, as it can accommodate the inter-
penetration of everyday beliefs and purposes, the produc-
tive practices they inform, and the idealization of those
practices as the embodiment of abstract justice, virtue,
natural law, or reason. Marx's description of the pro-
cess by which a ruling class idealizes its interests con-
firms the interpenetration of beliefs, practices, and
ideals. First, against an entrenched but increasingly
impotent dominant class, the new rising class's equation
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of its particular interests with the common interest is
not inapt. For a new rising class is symptomatic of an
emerging new world, in which the old dominant class and
its norms of action no longer have a definite place and
purpose. In the context of the juncture between feudal-
ism and capitalism, when the feudal obligations of the
peasantry were no longer matched by those of the lord;
when the conditions of feudal social relations of pro-
duction were eroded by the impact of trade, the growth
of cities, the opening of new lands; and when the feudal
elite had lost all but its parasitical functions, how
untrue was the claim of "moveable property"
to have won political freedom for the people,
to have removed the chains which bound civil
society, to have linked together different world,
to have established commerce which promotes
friendship between peoples. ... It has given
the people, in place of their crude wants, ci-
vilized needs and the means of satisfying them.
Second, the idealization of the interests of the dominant
class typically does not falsely describe (which is not
to say that it fully describes) the content of social re-
lations. The "characteristic misconception" of the rulinc
class is rather that it misplaces such relations, locat-
ing them outside the confines of history in an eternal
law of God, Nature, Reason, or Morality. Third, the
ideals of the dominant class to a greater or lesser ex-
tent inform the beliefs and hence the actions of all ac-
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tors in society. In this way ideology as idealization,
far from being a simple mental distortion of social prac-
tices and relations, is affirmed therein.
If in all ideology men and their circumstances
appear upside down as in a camera obscura
, this
phenomenon arises just as much from their his-
torical life process as the inversion of objects
in the retina does from their physical life pro-
cess. ^4
It commonly is believed that this camera obscura
metaphor was Marx's crude attempt to improve upon the
reflection theory of everyday ideological consciousness.
The notion of ideology as a simple "inversion" of events
and relations in the objective world so little illuminates
the matter, that even Marx's most sympathetic critics
have rejected it. But if one sets the passage against
its proper context, it is clear that Marx refers by "ide-
ology" not to the everyday understanding persons have of
their situation, but to the theoretical understanding
German philosophers (the "German ideologists") had of the
relationship between ideas and the world of embodied per-
sons and practices. His point is that if, to all ideal-
ists, embodied individuals and their practices appear as
the expression of objective Ideas and categories, this
inversion of the real relationship of ideas to human be-
ings and social practices has its explanation in the his-
torical circumstances in which idealism arose. It is
significant that the much maligned metaphor appears at
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the end of that passage in which Marx had to insist a-
gainst the idealists, that real, existing human beings
are the producers of their ideas and conceptions. His
description of the method of "ideologists" is clearly a
critique of the idealist method; no less the method of
those deriving the "relationships of men" from the es-
sence of man, than of those deriving the relationships of
men from the Absolute Spirit. Lastly, he goes on to root
the inverted self-understanding of the idealists in the
division between mental and manual labor, which makes it
possible for consciousness to see itself as divorced from
practice and as floating in a realm of pure, universal
theory. Marx's explanation of German idealism obviously
is an insufficient one, but his metaphor is not off the
mark
.
In a more general sense, the inversion of the re-
lationship between ideas and social practice is charac-
teristic of any class society in which not actual histor-
ical classes, but rather their interests idealized as
universal truths, appear to govern social life. In this
sense it is true that ideology as inversion informs
everyday beliefs about the world, but, as we have seen,
it is a complex inversion, in which real class interests
are transformed into universal ideals, which then appear
as the subjects or authors of history. Indeed, through-
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out his work Marx quite explicitly argues that it is the
tendency of every dominant class to idealize its inter-
ests. Each new rising class, he asserts in The German
Ideology
,
is forced "to represent its interest as the
common interest of all members of society, put in ideal
form; it will give its ideas the form of universality,
and represent them as the only rational, universally
56
valid ones." in The Poverty of Philosophy he describes
the categories of the bourgeois economists as the theore-
tical expression of historically limited relations of
production, represented as fixed, immutable, eternally
57
valid categories (of labor, credit, money, etc.). In
The Communist Manifesto he notes that the ruling class
transforms "into eternal laws of nature and of reason,
the social forms springing from the present mode of pro-
duction and form of proper ty--historical relations that
5 8
rise and disappear in the progress of production." In
Capital: "The advance of capitalist production develops a
working-class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks
upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-
59
evident laws of nature."
The reading of "reflection" as "idealization"
avoids the pitfalls of mechanism, and it allows one to
look beneath the ruling se If -interpretations of an age
(whether they be of the sanctity of fealty or the natural
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origin of private property) to the material relations of
production requiring, sustaining, and expressing them.
However, new conceptual dilemmas arise when Marx extends
the notion of reflection to refer not just to ideals,
but to politics, art, religion, etc., which he claims re-
flect in idealized form the reality of material produc-
tion. We have seen that Marx never was clear about whe-
ther politics, et_al. are only principles or also prac-
tices. We have argued that politics et al . only make
sense as practices expressive of ideas, and that if ideas
are internal to practice, one set of practices never can
be explained solely in terms of another set rather than
also in its own terms--in terms of the purposes, beliefs
and norms which inform it. Nor can an entire form of life
be explained without some reference to all the sets of
practices characterizing it. But how can a given practice
have even limited explanatory power, if the ideas it ex-
presses are wholly a function of class relations in the
sphere of material production? A theory which posits cer-
tain practices as ideological reflections of others— in
this case economic ones— takes three steps of dubious
validity: (1) the distinction of practice into "moral
practice," "political practice," "artistic practice,"
etc., along with the assertion that only the practice of
material production can leave its mark on the rest. This
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step rules out the interpenetration of various modes of
practice—most significantly, the penetration of pro-
ductive by other modes of practice. Thus the religious
motivation involved in a particular economic decision,
the moral considerations informing or not informing an
employer's relationship with his employees, and the poli-
tical impulse behind a change in industrial concentra-
tion, become incomprehensible except as guises for purely
economic considerations. (2) The reduction of the social
elaboration of norms, ideals, and values; the beliefs and
purposes they inform; and all practices other than those
directly concerned with material production, to mystified
forms of the relations and practices of the productive
process. Thus legal, political, religious, aesthetic,
and philosophic forms become incomprehensible except as
forms in which human beings are conscious of and act in
6 0
response to the material conditions of production.
(3) As an entailment of (1) and (2) , the denial that other
practices besides material production may be mystified on
their own account.
The flaws in this theoretical procedure become
evident when Marx seeks to understand religion. It is
a trite fact that Feuerbach declared the idea of God to
be the fantastic alienation of the human essence, and
that Marx improved upon Feuerbach by looking for the
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causes of this alienation in human history. Marx de-
scribes religion as an ideological practice— in fact, as
the most severely ideological of all superstructural
practices because its object is an imaginary one. For
the young Marx, heaven is a "fantastic" reality which re-
flects the secular, historical world in two ways. It
contains the historically specific desires, beliefs and
values of that world in fantastic form. It also arises
out of an actual historical situation which requires il-
lusions of happiness and security to deflect attention
from real, socially created suffering and/or from the
fear inspired by an imperfect understanding of nature.
The key to religious consciousness, then, lies in the se-
6
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cular rather than the theological world. To the extent
that the explanation of the secular world lies in the
practices of material production, the explanation of re-
ligion will be found there too. From his early writings
to Capital , Marx's view of the religious world as a re-
flex of the real one remains basically the same, although
in Capital his analysis of the real world is more intri-
cate and precise.
Now, if gods and spirits are purely fantastical
or "pseudo" beings, one certainly cannot look to them for
the real explanation of religious or non-religious prac-
tice. In this sense Marx is not making an unjustifiable
point when he describes religion as having its roots in
secular practices. But at the same time, and however
illusory their object, the religious beliefs of human
beings surely must enter into the explanation of religious
practice. And it is neither logically impossible nor his-
torically inaccurate that these beliefs also may help ex-
plain certain facets of secular life, including material
productive practice. For example, given his assumption
that God is an illusory being, Marx is correct in observ-
ing that the sabbath Jew cannot be understood without re-
ference to the everyday Jew. (In a passage which reveals
an additional, quite insidious danger of reductionism,
Marx then defines the everyday Jew as the economic, com-
6 2
mercial, money-making Jew.) However, it is certainly
the case that while the sabbath Jew cannot be understood
without reference to the everyday Jew, the sabbath Jew
also cannot be understood without reference to the sab-
bath Jew: without reference to the religious beliefs and
norms which inform her religious praceice. Such beliefs
enjoy a complexity far richer than that which material
productive practice could sustain. Indeed, even the eco-
nomic Jew cannot be understood without reference to the
sabbath Jew, for the economic role played by the Jews in
Europe from the feudal era onwards, was contingent upon
the simple peculiarity of their religious beliefs and
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practices within the larger Christian setting. By this
peculiarity the Jews could be identified as a separate
group and subjected to special regulations restricting
rights to land and occupation.
Let us examine a second example of the interpene-
tration of religion and economic practice. The Catholic
Church's prohibition of usury, effective until the 11th
century, helped preserve a social system in which the
Church had great political, social, and economic power.
Thus this religious norm had roots in very secular in-
terests. At the same time, however, one cannot account
for the medieval practice of loaning money without inter-
est unless one makes reference to the fact that most of
the population of feudal Europe, including the clergy
themselves, firmly believed it a sin to profit from an-
other's misfortune. The idea of sin might be fantasti-
cal. The belief in it was not. In this way religion
mediated economic relations.
Marx is more often imprecise than reductionist
about the connections between various modes of human prac-
tice. But at his most strident—when he declares that
politics, art, philosophy et al. are merely mystified
analogues of material production--he shows a blindness to
the rich and intricate texture of social life which Ilegel
so finely understood. He shows this blindness again when
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he paints his rather flat picture of a future conmunist
order. In the Communist Manifesto
, he states that the
form which class antagonism takes varies from one his-
torical epoch to the next, while exploitation per se has
remained a constant. Similarly, the social conscious-
ness of past ages, while varying in content, "moves with-
in certain common forms, or general ideas." The pre-
cise content of such ideas--which Marx identifies as
morality, religion, philosophy, law, freedom and justice--
changes from one exploitative epoch to the next, but the
ideas themselves as general forms "cannot completely va-
nish except with the total disappearance of class antago-
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nisms." It is important to be quite clear about Marx's
meaning. He is arguing, first of all, that freedom, jus-
tice; the moral point of view; philosophical and aesthetic
truths, are not elements of a natural law but are social
constructs. He is arguing, secondly and emphatically,
that these social constructs accrue only to exploitative
societies, whose relations they mystify. Hence they will
disappear altogether with the advent of a classless fu-
ture. "The Communist revolution is the most radical rup-
ture with traditional property relations; no wonder that
its development involves the most radical rupture with
traditional ideas. "^^ With this peculiar remark, Marx
discards for the future almost all the significant albeit
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class-permeated modes of social experience of the past,
with of course one critical exception. The logical di-
lemma thereby introduced is not merely whether all thought
and action will be completely transparent after the com-
munist revolution, but whether there will be any thought
and action at all, beyond that concerning the production
of goods. It is, in fact, unthinkable that any revolu-
tion should bring about a complete rupture with all past
modes of thought, and unimaginable that it should bring
about a complete rupture with all past forms of action.
The concept of exploitation itself and some concept of
freedom, for a start, certainly must have a place in po-
litical discourse on both sides of the divide, for else
what meaning would a non-exploitative society have for
those who struggled to bring it into existence? To state
that a revolution marks a conceptual and practical trans-
formation of, rather than break with, the past, is not to
say that certain modes of thought and action will not dis-
appear altogether. If one accepts Marx's analysis of God
as the fantastical reflection of human beings, for ex-
ample, one can imagine religion dissolving in its en-
tirety, although at a pace far slower than the term "rup-
ture" implies. On the other hand, one can also imagine
the re-appearance of religion with the emergence of new
antagonisms among human beings and between humans and
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nature. It is almost but not entirely beyond the scope
of the imagination that under certain, anarchistic forms
of communism, formal law would disappear. But one would
have a hard time identifying a socialist society as a
society at all, if in addition to a transformed set of
productive relations, it did not incorporate some trans-
formed concept of freedom; some notion of the moral point
of view; some experience of art and beauty; some musings
on the meanings of human existence; and lastly some poli-
tical intercourse between social individuals concerning
their common affairs.
The idea of a rupture between a flat future and a
complex if ideological past, appears again in Marx's
claim that all consciousness is class consciousness. By
this Marx does not mean that there cannot be a disjuncture
between ones own class position and ones ideas and in-
terests. In the Communist Manifesto
, for example, he
notes that historically, "a small section of the ruling
class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary
class; "^^ that the falling lower middle class may become
revolutionary, deserting "their own standpoint" to defend
6 7
"not their present, but their future interests;" and
that the proletarian may be joined in their revolution
by "a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have
raised themselves to the level of understanding theore-
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tically the historical movement as a whole. "^^ But while
there can be a disjuncture between ones particular class
position and ones particular class consciousness, there
cannot be a disjuncture between class and consciousness per
se. Given Marx's equation of consciousness with class con-
sciousness, and his reduction of all political, religious,
moral and aesthetic notions and practices to mere mystifi-
cations of exploitative productive relations, it is diffi-
cult to imagine what consciousness will look like after
classes and exploitation disappear. The three logical pos-
sibilities Marx leaves open are all unpalatable. That the
revolution will bring the end of all consciousness is pa-
tently ludicrous; that it v;ill bring the end of all con-
sciousness except that about the nuts and bolts of material
production, highly distasteful; and that it will bring
about the demise of the ideological mind and the creation
of the unideological one, literally incomprehensible.
The idealization of the social relations of pro-
duction, which infects both thought and practice, is a
critical part of the dynamic of mystification. But the
mystification of capitalist social relations is distin-
guished from its feudal predessor by an additional turn
of the screw.
The fact that the lord of a feudal manor lived
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off the labor of others was evident to lord and serf
alike; "every serf knows that what he expends in the ser-
vice of his lord, is a definite quantity of his own per-
sonal labour-power."^^ The mystification of the exploi-
tation of the serf consisted in its justification, not
merely by a set of beliefs and values supporting the re-
lationship of landowner to tenant (beliefs in natural
hierarchy, organic social ties, differential rights and
obligations; values of obedience, loyalty and honor), but
by the entire layered complex of practices and relations
comprising feudal society. The relationship of nobleman
to king, petty lord to great, knight to lord, replicated
and thereby legitimized the ties of unequal personal de-
pendence which so explicitly marked the social relations
of production on the lord's estate. As Marx put it, "per-
7 n
sonal dependence form[ed] the groundwork of society,"
and so concealment of exploitation was unnecessary. What
the hierarchical whole of medieval life did obscure, were
the purely social origin of the unequal rights and duties
linking its members in relations of superiority and sub-
ordination, and the crucial economic stake which the
feudal elite had in the stability of those relations.
In the Second Manuscript , Marx describes how the
feudal lord conceals from himself his economic interests
and represents the social relations which protect those
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interests in purely moral, political, and religious terms.
The capitalist, on the contrary, freely admits his eco-
nomic motivations and idealizes in moral, political, and
religious terms the social relations which are their re-
sult. Of the clash between the two, the landowner
emphasizes the noble lineage of his property,
feudal souvenirs, reminiscences
. . . his open-
hearted character, his political importance, etc.
. . .
he portrays his opponent as a sly, bar-
gaining, deceitful, mercenary
. . . soulless in-
dividual
. . . without honor, principle, poetry
. . .
who is alienated from the community which
he freely trades away, and who breeds, nourishes
and cherishes competition and along with it po-
verty, crime and the dissolution of all social
bonds
.
The capitalist in return
pities his opponent as a simpleton, ignorant of
[his] own nature (and this is entirely true) who
wishes to replace moral capital and free labor by
crude, immoral coercion and serfdom ... a Don
Quixote who, beneath the appearance of direct-
ness, decency, the general interest and stability,
conceals his incapacity for development, greedy
self-indulgence, selfishness, sectional interest,
and evil intention.
That the triumph of "overt baseness" over "con-
cealed baseness" was also the triumph of concealed ex-
ploitation over overt exploitation, Marx fully understood
only years later. It is in Capital that he exposes the
double nature of the mystification of capitalist social
realtions of production: the concealment of the real, ex-
ploitative relations, and the idealization of the appar-
ent, non-exploitative relations of production. The my-
stification of the apparent social relations of produc-
tion, like its feudal counterpart, originates as a dy-
namic of the self-understanding of an age. The charac-
teristic forms of these relations are transformed into
universally valid norms and truths which in turn to a
greater or lesser degree inform the beliefs and practices
of both capitalist and wage-laborer. The mystification
of the real social relations of production by concealment,
which has no feudal counterpart, originates as a dynamic
of the organization of capitalist production itself. It
is intrinsic to the mode of capitalist production that
the social relations of production show themselves as
that which they are not: as non-exploitative relations
between equal, independent agents. This appearance is
not an illusion of the mind. Rather, it comprises the
real surface of capitalist productive relations: the
sphere of circulation and exchange. Marx's imagery of
an essence which puts itself forth as appearance, both
sides of which are real and necessary parts of a whole,
is evocative of Hegel's analysis of "essence" as the se-
cond category of the Logic . One (but not the only) cru-
cial difference is that according to Marx the apparent
relations of capitalist production do not directly ex-
press, but both express (in that they are a function of)
and conceal (in that they are the "opposite" of) their
inner workings
.
What exactly is the form the relations of capital-
ist production take in the sphere of circulation? Capi-
talist and wage-laborer face each other in the market-
place as independent property-owners, the capitalist the
owner of capital and the laborer of labor-power, who are
free to enter into contractual relations with each other.
The capitalist pays the worker the full value of his
labor-power in exchange for the right to use it as the
capitalist sees fit. Exchange relations hence are rela-
tions of freedom, interpreted as the ability to do what
one wants without interference, and equality, interpreted
as the ability to receive full value for what one ex-
changes on the market. And just at the dependent and un-
equal productive relations of feudalism were idealized
through a morality of traditionally sanctified, unequal
rights and obligations, the apparent productive relations
of capitalism are idealized through a morality of natural
right, in which persons are seen and treated ad indepen-
dent and equal individuals with inherent rights to free-
dom and private property. Legal relations in the same
way express in the ideal form of justice these apparent
social relations. The contractual relation, in which
owners of commodities "mutually recognize in each other
the rights or private proprietors," is a juridical rela-
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tion "between two wills, and is but the reflex of the
real economic relation between the two."^^
It is by means of a "fetishism of commodities"
that the free and equal relations of the sphere of cir-
culation-- that "very Eden of the innate rights of man""^^—
obscure in two ways the reality of the productive sphere.
(1) The commodity- form of goods produced for exchange con-
ceals the social nature of labor and the social origin of
value. Relations between individual producers are medi-
ated by "relations" between their inanimate products,
which appear to exchange with each other according to some
inherent, objective value in each commodity. The rela-
tions between their products takes place independently of
the will of the producers, and this fact is not affected
by the discovery, which only "removes all appearance of
mere accidentali ty from the determination of the magni-
7 5
tude of the value of products," that the real determi-
nant of value is labor-time. For as long as production
takes the form of the private production of goods for
exchange, the producers will continue to be dependent
for the satisfaction of their needs upon the activities
of their products in the marketplace. The control which
the relations between products have over the relations be-
tween producers is particularly evident in times of eco-
nomic crises, when exchange relations prohibit rather than
provide the medium for the fulfillment of needs. (2) The
commodity-form of labor-power and capital conceals the
exploitative relationship between capitalist and wage-
laborer. First, the equal exchange of value for value-
specifically, of capital in the form of wages for the full
value of labor-power—obscures the appropriation by the
capitalist of surplus-labor from the worker, for which
the latter receives nothing in exchange. This appropri-
ation is possible because the worker creates more than
his own value in a day's work. Thus while he receives in
wages the equivalent of the full value of his labor-power,
he receives in wages the equivalent of only a part of the
total value he creates. Second, the exchange of commo-
dities as private property masks the fact that the capital
exchanged for labor-power is itself dead labor or "con-
gealed labor time." Capital appears as an animate pro-
perty of the capitalist which has the magical powers of
activity and self-enlargement. Inversely, the animate
power of the worker to objectify his purposes in nature
appears as a thing which he can alienate from himself.
The ultimate consequence of this alienation is the en-
hancement of capital. Third, the freedom of exchange be-
tween capitalist and wage-laborer hides the fact that "be-
hind the factory door" the worker is forced to produce
more than his own value in order to receive his value in
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wages
.
In the market he stood as owner of the commodity,
"labour-power," face to face with the other owners
of commodities, dealer against dealer. The con-
tract by which he sold to the capitalist his
labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white
that he disposed of himself freely. The bargain
concluded, it is discovered that he was no "free
agent," that the time for which he is free to sell
his labour-power is the time for which he was
forced to sell it . . .76
In sum, the sphere of circulation and exchange is
the key to the mystification of capitalist productive re-
lations. First, the social relations of production as
they appear in this sphere--as relations of freedom and
equality between owners of commodities— are idealized in
morality, law, religion, which in turn support the orga-
nization of production. Second, the appearance of social
relations of production in the sphere of circulation con-
ceals by means of commodity fetishism the inner reality
of the social nature of labor, the social determination
of value, the forced appropriation of surplus-labor from
the worker by the capitalist, and the activity of labor
as the secret of capital.
For two distinct reasons, it cannot be said that
the mystification of exploitative productive relations is
simply a matter of false ideas which persons have of
their real situation. First, ideology as the idealization
of historically limited social relations successfully my-
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stifies those relations only to the extent that it informs
the beliefs and hence the actions of the participants.
Persons do not move about in the world without ideas and
then think about the world in idealized terms. The in-
tention, "this is what is due by right to the lord," is
internal to the action of the obedient serf who weaves
her cloth. Indeed, her weaving for the lord cannot be
understood apart from this intention, although the latter
is not a sufficient explanation of the former. Second,
and peculiar to the case of capitalism, the mystification
through concealment of the inner reality of production
occurs by means of a set of real practices and relations.
Such practical mystification, of course, is as little di-
vorced from beliefs and purposes as is practice in ge-
neral. Not only are beliefs about their free and equal
status expressed in the interactions of commodity-owners
in the marketplace, but through commodity fetishism the
idea of "a day's work for a day's pay" informs the acti-
vity of the laborer in the factory.
That mystification, whether as idealization or
concealment, is not a simple distortion of the real,
practical world but helps comprise it, complicates the
study of ideology in class society and exacerbates the
difficulties of transforming that society through popular
revolution. Both student and revolutionary face a situa-
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tion in which persons engage in an entire complex of
practices expressing beliefs and purposes for which, con-
sequently, "false" is too crude a term. It is important
however not to overstate the case. While the idealiza-
tion of productive relations infects the beliefs, pur-
poses and actions of participants in those relations,
and while beliefs and purposes enter into the practices
concealing the inner reality of capitalist production;
it would be odd to assert that consciousness in class so-
ciety is never more than ideological consciousness, and
practice never more than the expression of ideological
ideas. This is not just because theoretical room must be
left for the possibility of critical thought and revolu-
tionary action. More fundamentally, one otherwise could
not explain the prosaic doubts, resentments, suspicions
and hostile actions of persons who yet do not fully un-
derstand and/or do not revolt in an overt or systematic
way
.
A categorical denial of agency and hence dignity
to the inhabitants of past and present devalues popular
activity in a way that capital itself has never done. It
also removes historical support from a future in which,
according to Marx, human agency and dignity are to bear
their richest fruit. This is not to say, of course, that
such a devaluation is thereby incorrect, or that a future
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of more complete human agency in fact has historical sup-
port. But only the gravest of consequences lie in wait
for a politics which attempts to wrench free and rational
social relations out of relations it believes to be
thoroughly coerced and mystified.
CHAPTER IV
THE METHOD
The word must often used to describe Marx's me-
thod is, of course, "materialist." That there is no ideal
reality beneath or prior to social practice, and that the
most significant practices of all have to do with the pro-
duction of goods for the physical maintenance of life, are
the essential premises of Marx's study of bourgeois eco-
nomy and his search for its explanation inside the boun-
daries of the social world. Nevertheless, his investi-
gation proceeds along lines one could not call "material-
ist" in any simple sense of the term. For when he looks
at the productive process, he does not see patterns of
material behavior, but a complex of social relations which
have a brute-physical dimension but also entail non-
material meanings, beliefs, and purposes. And when he
explains the capital-wage labor relation, he does so not
in terms of external material causes, nor for that matter
in terms of the beliefs and purposes of its participants,
but rather by reference to an inner, abstract, objective
logic. Marx's method has empirical, interpretive, and
structural components. But it is the third, least "ma-
terialist" component which lends the method its greatest
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power, and its gravest weakness. His analysis of an inner
logic of capital allows him to lay bare the secret of
capitalist development. it also brings him dangerously
close to that final border dividing a materialist social
theory from a theory which explains social life as de-
termined by an objective Idea.
Marx begins his journey to the heart of bourgeois
society in the way he believes every "genuine materialist"
must: by examining its actual practices, and by examining
its productive rather than religious, political, or artis-
tic practices. He does not, however, conduct this exami-
nation along strictly empiricist lines. He understands
the labor process to be inherently purposive, and although
the particular purposes the laboring subject embodies in
the object do not "show" on the physique of either, they
help constitute the identity of both. As the intentions
and interests which inform productive practice change over
the course of history, what the intentional subject is,
and what the intended object is, change as well. Marx is
fond of saying (although not in these words) that the ob-
ject of labor is a text in which one can read the progress
of the human intellect. Empirical observation is blind
to this text. It can grasp neither the meanings which
help constitute the subject and object of labor, nor the
dynamism which the "unceasing sensuous labour and crea-
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tion""^"^ lend the natural and social world. Empirical ob-
servation equally is unable to capture the relations be-
tween human beings engaged in the labor process. Rela-
tions per se, Marx reminds us, cannot be sensed, but "can
be established as existing only be being thought. ""^^
More germaine, specifically social relations are not redu-
cible to sense-data, because they entail a shared field
of meanings within which participants conceive of them-
selves, their relations to the natural world, and their
relations to one another. These meanings can be inter-
preted; they cannot be observed. When Marx looks at the
relations between persons in productive practice, then,
he does not see simply material beings in physical rela-
tions to one another. Nor, however, does he see inten-
tional individuals acting in accordance with the dictates
of their private reasons. Rather, he sees participants
whose particular beliefs, interests and ends are a func-
tion of the specific relations in which they stand towards
one another as they engage in productive activity. It is
symptomatic of the complexity of Marx's vision, that when
he looks at the object of labor, he also sees it pri-
marily not as a material thing with a purpose or use, but
as a symbolic expression of the social relations under which
it was produced: symbolic because these social relations
can be neither directly observed in, nor inferred from.
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the object's i)hy.sic<il form. Thus Marx states that the
object of labor under caf.ital is both a material product,
and a symbol of the labor-time necessary for its prodvic-
tion and the relation between waqe-laborer and capital
which that production entails. As a symbol or value,
"not an atom of matter enters into its composition."^'"^
Exactly because the commodity expresses another reality
besides that of its physical being and use, Marx can make
it the central category through wliieh he will unpack the
whole of ca[)italist social relations.
Marx, then, examines the real world of production
as a complex of meaning-laden social relations, purposive
actions, and objects expressive of both. However, he does
not look for the explanation of capitalist production in
the shared purposes and meanings of its human partici-
pants. To the contrary, he finds a systematic dis junc-
ture between the appearance and the reality of the
capital-wage labor relation, v/hich challenges not merely
the evidence of (he senses, but more critically the way
participants understand what they are doing and why they
are doing it. Tliis dis Juncture also calls into question
the theoretical reflections of their "scientific represen-
tatives," who, i;n(iels remarks, "generally have been con-
tent to take, just as they were?, the terms of commercial
8 0
and industrial life, and to operate with them." Or, to
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put it as Marx does, they "are unable to separate the form
of appearance from the thing that appears. "^^ It is tell-
ing of Marx's posture towards interpretive methodology on
the one side and empiricist methodology on the other, that
he does not discard the categories which capitalist so-
ciety uses to understand itself "in order to look at the
facts as they really are." Marx quite explicitly begins
his analysis of capital on the basis of the categories of
bourgeois political economy— that is, from within a lan-
guage which mystifies the capital-wage labor relation.
He does so because he sees this mystification as a func-
tion of the capitalist mode of production itself. To un-
ravel the way in which each economic category obscures the
capital-wage labor relation, is at once to make that re-
lation transparent and to grasp how it "puts itself forth"
in opaque form. The category at the center of Marx's
8 2
attention is the coiranodity. We have seen that he is
interested not in the commodity as a physical thing, but
in its "second existence" as a \7alue or symbol of social
production relations. He argues that the commodity as
value symbolizes these social relations only in opaque
form. Value, a function of the labor time necessary for
the commodity's production, appears in the commodity as
exchange value, a quantitative relation between material
objects themselves. This opaque appearance of value sup-
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presses the division of the labor-time embodied in the
commodity into necessary and surplus labor-time. Because
the commodity as exchange value is a deceptive symbolic
form which helps obscure capital's exploitation of wage-
labor, Marx calls it a "hieroglyphic" of capitalist rela-
tions. Money is a yet more complex hieroglyphic, for
here exchange value is detached from the particular com-
modity and appears as an independent metallic existence
found in nature. Of course, it is money as capital which
is the target of Marx's investigations. He will show how
an apparently sel f -generative material thing, is in truth
a social relation between objectified and living labor.
Marx drav;s out the depth meanings , hidden from
bourgeois society itself, of the concepts of the commo-
dity, money, exchange value, capital, private property,
and so on. He thus works downwards from the appearance
of capital as natural and just, to its reality as exploi-
tative of wage-labor. And by describing the real dynamic
of this exploitative social relation, he works outwards
to the historical boundaries of what had appeared to be
a fixed mode of production and an eternally valid concep-
tual framework. In sum, he undermines the self-image of
bourgeois society from within the set of concepts with
which it understands itself. One happy consequence is
that he maintains a conceptual link with the participants
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in capitalist social life, who are not prohibited from
comprehending his theory and making critical judgement
upon it.
If, in the end, Marx does not find the explana-
tion of bourgeois social relations in the meanings and
purposes of its participants, where does he find it? His
explanatory method is this: he abstracts from the actual,
"concrete" world of capital to its inner logical struc -
ture
.
Here he locates the secret of real productive prac-
tice. In the Grundrisse
,
when Marx speaks of the abstract
structure as opposed to the actual social practice of
capital, he uses the term "the concept of capital." Thus
he states that limits to capitalist production are founded
8 3in "the essential character of its very concept;" that
the division of the product into parts corresponding to
raw material necessary labor, and surplus labor is "in-
QA
herent in the concept of capital;" * that "It belongs to
the concept of capital that the increased productive force
of labor is posited rather as the increase of a force
outside itself, "^^ and so on. The concept of capital,
then, includes all the internal implications of the
capital-wage labor relation: it describes the internal co-
herence and dynamic of a set of social relations stripped
of the rich but confusing texture of actual life. Re-
marking in Capital that he will treat capital accumulation
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"in the abstract," Marx explains that he will disregard
"all phenomena that hide the play of its inner mecha-
8 6
nism." He thus ignores the possibility that goods will
be sold above their value, or that surplus value will be
divided among capitalists, landowners, and banks, or, for
that matter, that capitalists will give ever larger pro-
portions of their personal consumption fund to their psy-
chiatrists, or . . . but one could go on and on, for these
elaborations are what makes life life and not logic. It
is perhaps impossible for Marx to define the precise ex-
tent to which the logic of capital determines the real
life of capitalist society. That there is an extent to
which it does not, he readily admits when he comments that
the logic will be much modified by the play of actual cir-
cumstances. But his basic claim stands: it is in this lo-
gic that the explanation of capital lies.
With his notion of an objective abstract structure
of production, Marx makes his last, irrevocable break
with the empiricists. He also assumes a complex stance
towards interpretive theory. He is attentive in studying
the beliefs which inform capitalist social relations.
However, he studies them not as an explanation of those
relations, but as clues which at once point to and ob-
scure an explanation located elsewhere. In truth, his
mature method of seeking social explanation in an objec-
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tive, abstract logic, is profoundly Hegelian. His most
difficult task, in consequence, will be to exploit the
power of Hegel's logic without succumbing to Hegel's vi-
sion of society as expressive of an abstract Idea.
To distance himself from Absolute Idealism, Marx
makes three important distinctions between his method of
abstraction and Hegel's own. First, he insists that theo-
retical abstractions always are abstractions from a so-
cially and historically specific reality. So-called uni-
versal concepts have no real content. It is impossible,
he declares, to deduce the content of a particular social
division of labor from "the single word divide, from the
8 7idea, the category." Likewise, "to try to give a de-
finition of property as ... an abstract and eternal
8 8idea, can be nothing but an illusion of metaphysics."
From the early writings on, Marx believes that the vali-
dity of theoretical categories is contingent upon a par-
ticular, historically limited set of social practices.
Secondly, he asserts against Hegel that there is no ne-
cessary correlation between the logical priority of ana-
lytic categories and the historical sequence in which so-
cial relations arise. The logical priority of analytic
categories is determined solely by the set of relations
which predominate in the social whole.
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In all forms of society there is one specifickind of production which predominates over the
rest, whole relations thus assign rank and influ-
ence to the others. it is a general illumina-
tion which bathes all the other colours and mo-difies their particularity . ^9
Thus, although rent and landed property appear histori-
cally before capital.
Capital is the all dominant economic power of
bourgeois society. It most form the starting-
point as well as the finishing-point, and must
be dealt with before landed property. ^0
Marx likewise carefully distinguishes the abstract con-
cept of capital from its real historical development.
The conditions under which primitive accumulation oc-
curs are part of the historical formation, but not of the
developed system, of capitalist production. When capital
has supplanted the external conditions of its origin with
the exploitation of wage-labor, it "proceeds from itself
9
to create the conditions of its maintenance and growth,"
and its internal dynamic provides its explanation. For
this reason, to comprehend the capital-wage labor rela-
tion, "it is not necessary to write the real history of
92
the relations of production .
"
Third and most important, Marx asserts that the
movement from abstract concept to the concrete, living
whole is only a method by which the scientist seeks to
comprehend the concrete.
[T]he method of rising from the abstract to the
concrete is only the way in which thought appro-
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priates the concrete. ... But this is by no means
the process by which the concrete itself comes into
being. For example, the simplest economic cate-
gory, say e.g., exchange value, presupposes
. . .
an already given, concrete, living whole. . . .
The real subject retains its autonomous existence
outside the head just as before; namely as long
as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely
theoretical
.
The abstract concept of capital does not have ontological
priority over the concrete world of capital. That con-
cept is not the "first cause" of the living world, nor
its "true reality." Both the authorship and real content
of concrete social life lie in human activity bounded by
a set of natural limitations. Marx still insists, how-
ever, that participants in capitalist society act accord-
ing to a logic of which they are unaware, and which de-
termines their productive practice. He thus stands on
the razor's edge of a determinist theory of capital which
is not, ironically, materialist but idealist. In fact,
he is able to come just short of proposing that social
practice has an ideal cause. How does he do so? The
answer lies in his peculiar distinction between appearance
and reality. Unlike Hegel, Marx does not see the actual,
concrete world as the phenomenal (which is not to say
"illusory") appearance of an inner, ideal reality. In-
stead of equating appearance with concrete social life
and reality with its inner logic, he roots the appearance/
reality distinction within the logical structure of capi-
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tal itself. In other words, capital is characterized by
a structural duplicity: it is "part of its concept" that
it appears other than it is. The actual participants in
bourgeois society experience the real, concrete market-
place and the real, concrete factory in terms of the ap-
parent structure of capital, which masks the exploitation
entailed by the hidden structure. The curious consequence
is this: the participants are blind to the logic of the
capital-wage labor relation, even though this logic is but
the expression of their own actions . Humans author the
dyanmic of the relation without knowing that they do so,
and because that dynamic is deceptive, they act without
knowing why they do what they do. Their action is not
the less determined for being subject to no cause beyond
itself. For Hegel, on the contrary, human actors do not
produce a logic of which they are unaware, but only ex-
press such a logic in their practices, for they are not in
the ultimate sense authors at all.
Marx, then, articulates the abstract logic of
capital alone in terms strongly reminiscent of Hegel's
articulation of the relationship between the abstract
Idea and its concrete, phenomenal expression. He de-
scribes capital as a totality whose abstract structure is
divided into surface and depth, alienated and inverted
object and subject; and which moves according to its own
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internal and eventually self-destructive dynamic.
In the introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx
sketches the following argument: that the apparently se-
parate, independent spheres or "totalities" of production
proper, exchange, distribution and consumption are in
truth internal "moments" of a larger whole. Thus their
relations are not external and contingent, but internal
to and required by the whole of a productive process.
This whole is internally structured. Its predominant mo-
ment is production proper: "A definite production . . .
determines a definite consumption, distribution and ex-
change as well as definite relations between these dif -
94ferent moments." In turn, a set of internal, struc-
tured relations holds between the dominant mode of pro-
duction in a given society and the remnants and begin-
nings of other modes. It is not, for example, as an ex-
ternal, separate cause that capital affects agrarian and
money-lending activities inherited from a feudal past.
Rather, commodity relations re-constitute these activi-
ties, so that they become fundamentally different actions
from what they had been before. The one looses its pa-
ternalistic character, and other its moral stigma, as both
are "bathed in capital's general illumination."
In the actual text of the Grundrisse , Marx refers
to capital as "organic," a "totality," whose development
|i
I
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"consists precisely in subordinating all elements of so-
ciety to itself, or in creating out of it the organs
which it still lacks;" and in which each economic relation
presupposes every other "in its bourgeois economic
9 5form." The developed system of capital, then, is a to-
tality of internally related, ordered parts which moves
according to its own internal dynamic. The "laws of capi-
tal," in consequence, are not descriptions of contingent,
mechanical relationships between discrete phenomena.
These objective laws instead are analytic: they describe
the inner relations which constitute capital and the inner
movement by which capital transforms and finally suspends
itself
.
The process of capitalist production is struc-
tured along two axes. The first is the vertical axis of
surface and depth. Marx uncovers this axis in the Grund-
risse
,
but it is familiar to most readers because of its
central place in Capital . The vertical structure of capi-
tal is comprised of two moments: the moment of circula-
tion and exchange, and the moment of the actual produc-
tion of commodities. While these two moments appear as
separate and independent processes, exchange in truth is
the surface of a larger process through which commodi-
ties created in the sphere of production are transformed
into money (the first act of exchange) and money is ex-
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changed for the subjective and objective conditions of
production (the second act). These conditions "disap-
pear" from exchange into the sphere of production, where
capital is created in the form of commodities, and appear
again in the sphere of circulation, where capital is re-
alized in the pure form of value, money. The whole of
capital's productive process encompasses both moments, so
that the independence of exchange from production is a
"mere semblance." The second way in which capital is in-
ternally structured is into subject and object. Not sur-
prisingly, the notion of this horizontal self-distinction
of capital appears very early in Marx's writings. In The
Holy Family , he describes the "world of private property"
as a whole whose internal, antithetical moments are wealth
97 • •
and the proletariat. Wealth is private property in its
positive, "self-satisfied" form: it seeks to maintain its
relation with its opposite. The proletariat is private
property in its negative, debased form: it seeks to de-
stroy that relation. This subject/object distinction be-
comes the central motif of the Grundrisse . Here Marx
sees the totality of capital as the unity of alienated
and inverted opposites: the subjective conditions of la-
bor (living labor capacity) and the objective conditions
of labor (raw materials, instruments of labor, means of
subsistence) . These opposites appear as autonomous
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agents—wage-labor and capitalist—who enter into rela-
tion with one another through the capitalist's exchange
of wages for the use of living labor capacity, in real-
ity, however, there is not one atom of a distinct, autono-
mous thing called capital. The capital which confronts
wage-labor in the sphere of exchange as the objective con-
ditions of labor, and exchanges with wage-labor as wages,
is in truth the surplus value created by labor ("the liv-
98mg source of value" ) in the sphere of production and
appropriated by the capitalist without exchange. The
wage-form, in which the value of living labor capacity
appears as the value of the labor embodied in a day's
work, only serves to obscure "the division of the working-
day into necessary and surplus-labour, into paid and un-
99paid labour." The laborer creates the value which ex-
ploits him as capital, and this exploitation is magni-
fied at the close of each productive cycle. Thus the re-
lation between labor and capital in truth is the relation
between labor-capacity in the form of subject or living
laborer, and labor-capacity which already has been objec-
tified. It is an alienated and inverted relation, be-
cause objectified labor assumes an autonomous existence
vis-a-vis the living laborer, and expands through its in-
corporation of living labor capacity. Thus, at the same
time that there is no capital which is not in truth ob-
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jectified labor, there is no wage-labor which is truly
autonomous of capital. Living labor becomes a mere mo-
ment of capital as a whole, the necessary means to its
multiplication. This is true not only after the particu-
lar act of exchange between wage-labor and capital. The
very act of exchange presupposes a prior separation of
living labor and its objective conditions, and the incor-
poration of the former as a subordinate constituent of
the latter. For otherwise, the laborer would not have to
sell its labor-power to transform the objective world,
and there would be no alien capital to buy it.
To sum up, the capital-wage labor distinction is
one internal to capital; but the apparently opposite sub-
jective and objective moments of capital are both in truth
entirely constituted of labor, one in living and the other
in dead form. Capital as a whole is comprised of the pro-
ductive and exchange relations (along its vertical axis)
of living to objectified labor (along its horizontal axis)
(see Figure 1). Objectified labor, the inverted subject,
increases itself at the expense of living labor in the
production sphere, and buys new living labor capacity in
the sphere of exchange. Oddly enough, the subject/object
structure of capital, while dominating the text of the
Grundrisse , seems almost absent from the pages of Capi-
tal. Here Marx probes in detail the division of capital
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into surface and depth, but speaks of the alienated and
inverted relation between subject and object only on iso-
lated occasions. This motif nonetheless is suppressed
rather than missing from the later work. It underpins
the theory of capital's domination of wage labor and the
laws of capital accumulation. It also is the key to the
dynamic of capital's development and demise.
Early in his writings, Marx praises Hegel for
identifying the "dialectic of negativity" as the "moving
q 4-- ..,,,101^and creating principle" of every social order. Marx
too looks to an internal dynamic rather than to external
causes in order to explain social transformation. But
unlike Hegel, Marx cannot found this dynamic in the de-
velopment of an abstract Idea and its manifestation as a
series of national spirits. He must attribute to some
facet of human practice alone, the tension which gives
way to new forms of social life. His ambivalence in
choosing the precise terms in which to explain transfor-
mation bespeaks what will become, as we have seen, a per-
sistent dilemma: is the development and particularly the
collapse of a social order to be attributed to the agency
of its human authors and actors, or to an objective logic
beyond their knowledge and control? In The Holy Family ,
Marx chooses the first path. He explains the impulse of
"private property" towards its dissolution almost en-
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tirely by reference to the proletariat's coming to class
consciousness and becoming a revolutionary agent. Simply
and precisely because it recognizes its own power lessness
and debasement, the proletariat is driven to destroy the
whole world of private property. In The German Ideology
,
The Poverty of Philosophy
, and The Communist Manifesto
,
Marx similarly describes the whole of bourgeois produc-
tion as internally divided into antagonistic bourgeoisie
and proletariat, and he again points to the emergence of
a class conscious proletariat as the agent of the demise
of the bourgeois order. He is newly careful, however, to
stipulate the material conditions under which revolution-
ary consciousness occurs. These conditions, to which the
objective development of capital itself gives birth, in-
clude the concentration of formerly isolated workers on
one place, the increasing numbers of property less la-
borers, their mounting insecurity and impoverishment,
the equalization of their interests as capital breaks
down separate skills into repetitive tasks, the growth in
communications, etc. The workers' struggle to protect
their common interests, which begins as a struggle to
maintain wages, becomes political and revolutionary when
they come to understand themselves as members of an op-
pressed class, whose true interest is in emancipating
it-
self from the world of capitalist relations.
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In the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx continues to
see capital as generating internal contradictions which
finally undermine it. The conditions of capitalist pro-
duction are "engaged in suspending themselves and hence in
positing the historic pre-suppositions for a new state of
102
society." But while he retains his dialectical view
10 3
of capital as self -negating , he makes a tremendous
theoretical advance over his earlier work. He discovers
an objective logic by which he can account for both capi-
tal's development and breakdown, so that his pronounce-
ment of this breakdown no longer dependent upon the simple
assertion that the proletariat will become a revolution-
ary class. While the early Marx argued that capital ne-
gates itself by creating a class-conscious proletariat as
its antithesis, the mature Marx shows how capital col-
lapses through objective contradictions which congeal
around its horizontal structure but reveal themselves
through its vertical structure. In an unintended conse-
quence of its drive to reduce necessary and increase sur-
plus labor, capital increases the proportion of fixed
capital, which does not create new value, to living labor,
which does. The magnification of the objective conditions
of production at the expense of the subjective, results
in the production of ever greater quantities of use values
with ever less direct expenditure of human labor, a
ris-
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ing proportion of surplus to necessary labor but a fall-
ing rate of profit; deepening crises of over-production
and consequently crises in circulation; and more severe
interruptions in the production of necessary as well as
surplus value.
Thus in his mature works, Marx looks first of all
not to the intentional action of the working class, but
to the objective requirements of capital, in order to
explain the evolution and breakdown of the capitalist
mode of production. Because he understands capital to be
the inverted subject of the productive process, his con-
cern with the way it dominates and determines that pro-
cess is not surprising. But he comes up against a seri-
ous dilemma when he wants to introduce the revolutionary
working-class into his mature theory--and this introduc-
tion is, after all, the point of his long intellectual
and political labors. His method of explaining capital
in terms of an objective logic provides no grounding for
the emergence of human agency inside the bounds of bour-
geois society. Nor does it follow, that because the lo-
gic of capital entails its own mystification, the collaps(
of capital will bring with it a rational break-through in
the self-understanding of an oppressed class. In truth,
Marx's explanatory method simply cannot accommodate the
possibility of human agency, whether it be revolutionary
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or not. This is why he is forced to push off the moment
of class struggle until the final pages of Capital. And
here, it is only through some strange cartesian synchrony
with capital's internal crises and decline, that a pro-
letariat emerges which understands its exploitation and
acts in accordance with its own, lucid reason. At this
point, Marx simply discards his structural analysis and
explains the communist revolution by sole reference to
the purposes of its participants.
CHAPTER V
SCIENCE, HISTORY, AND THE EXPLANATION
OF HUMAN ACTION
One of the most vivid images in Marx's social
theory, is the deep conceptual divide between action de-
termined by objective social forces, and action determined
by the agency of its human authors. This divide informs
Marx's vision of an historical juncture between alienated
and unalienated labor; his distinction between mystified
and transparent social relations; and the break between
his explanation of present social life in terms of an sb-
stract logic, and future social life in terms of the pur-
poses of its participants. His frankly dualistic under-
standing of action gives Marx a cutting edge with which to
critique the system of capital. It also forces him into
three theoretical contradictions. First, as a materialist,
he vehemently denies that history has its own ideas, aims,
or ends."'"'^'^ Yet he reads into the passage of time a begin-
ning and a middle--in which an original subject-object
unity is supplanted by an epoch of alienated and inverted
subject-object relations— and an end, or "real beginning"
in which the laboring subject freely controls the produc-
tive process. Second, as a rationalist, he firmly be-
185
186
com-
lieves that human beings one day will determine, with
plete lucidity, their own social relations. Yet he denies
any locus or historical precedent for rational agency when
he describes past thought as ideological and past action
as mystified. Finally, as an antagonist of capital, he is
deeply committed to the making of a revolutionary working
class. Yet his method of explaining the capital-wage la-
bor relation in terms of an objective dynamic undercuts
not the mere factual, but the logical basis for class con-
scious, revolutionary action.
Ironically, Marx could resolve these contradictions
if he were to make a small but vital shift in his under-
standing of human action: if he were to collapse what he
sees as two temporally distinct forms of action into two
analytically internal moments of action. On the one side
of the collapse, this would mean that every action, re-
gardless of the particular context or epoch in which it
occurs, entails the possibility that it become relatively
transparent to its particular author as well as to other
actors. Within any given act, then, the actor can become
more aware than she had been before, of the specific social
roots of her purposes and the larger social drama to which
her action contributes. In consequence, it is never a
closed case that an action is explicable entirely in terms
of an objective logic of practice. To the extent that the
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actor becomes relatively self-conscious, she is not simply
a bearer of purposes and beliefs determined elsewhere.
Although the outer shape of her behavior may be the same,
the explanatory status of her intentions is enhanced.
(Typically, however, the newly self-reflective actor will
be under internal pressure either to behave differently
as well, or to repress or distort what she has learned
about herself.) On the other side of the collapse, every
action, regardless of its social and historical milieu,
entails the possibility that it become relatively opaque
to its own particular author and to other actors. The
actor always is in danger--although conservatives would
refute the fact that it is a danger—of losing sight of
some aspect of what she is doing and why she is doing it.
In consequence, internal to every action is the possibil-
ity that it cannot be explained entirely in terms of the
socially constituted intentions and purposes of its au-
thor. To the extent that she does not comprehend the real
sources and impact of her action, that action, although
intentional, will be governed by a larger objective logic
of social practice of which she is unaware.
If we conceptualize action itself as internally
contradictory and multi- layered— as always, in shifting
proportions, relatively transparent and relatively opaque,
and as always, to shifting degrees, explicable in terms of
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intersubjective meanings and purposes and explicable in
terms of an objective logic of social practice—we can
extricate Marx's theory from some of its stubborn and
troublesome dilemmas. First, Marx no longer would be
forced to read history as moving towards a final climax
of freedom and rationality, in order to insure a place
in his theory for human agency. Conversely, in dismant-
ling what can only be described as an historical plot,
he would be free to re-construct the sorely inadequate no-
tion (which he himself discards when he discusses real
historical events) of past action as fully mystified and
future action as fully transparent. That past as well as
future action includes the possibilities for its own rela-
tive transparency, creates an opening through which one
can begin to glimpse the immensely various and subtle ways
in which action can conflict or mesh with (for it is not
inevitable that the self-conscious actor will be a rebel-
lious one) a given social order. That future as well as
past action includes the possibilities for its own opacity,
rules out a description of consciousness under communism
as statically and abstractly rational. Persons think with-
in a conceptual framework rooted in a particular, limited
mode of life, and this is as true in communism as in capi-
talism. The development of self-consciousness on the part
of the individual actor hence always will be a relative
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one, defined against and partially constrained by an in-
herited mode of thought and practice. Furthermore, self-
consciousness will always be a precarious possession, in
that the new social antagonisms which are bound to emerge
in any dynamic order, will give rise to new reasons for
opacity in social relations, and new standards of and
barriers to rational action. There is, as well, another
sense in which self-consciousness must be always partial.
Even in a society which has little need to mystify its own
relations, each person will act somewhat in the dark of
the actions of others, for two reasons. First, the actor
who pursues her own affairs is plunged at once into a
complex of events authored by many others besides her-
self, so that she never can be certain of what the conse-
quences of her actions will be. That immediate complex of
events, in turn, is underwritten by a dense web of prac-
tices whose strands extend far beyond the limits of the
actor's vision, so that she can be less certain still of
what larger pattern she is helping to create. Thus, the
very sociality of practice ensures that the actor can
have only an imperfect knowledge of what she is doing, at
least while she is doing it. Second, in her relations
with others, the actor continuously must face the dilemma
of how to disclose herself. This dilemma too, which she
experiences in terms of her specific situation, nonethe-
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less is inherent in the social nature of action. And
every resolution of what to conceal and what to reveal of
herself, of what to put in and leave out of her speech and
her movements, entails that she appears only guardedly to
otheres, who do not witness what was not said or done
after all. Each person, then, can have only an imperfect
knowledge of the reasons why others act as they do. This
is true when those others are intimate friends as well as
when they are strangers.
This inescapable opacity of social life is the
source of much of its frustration and some of its tragedy.
It is also the source of two of its greatest pleasures:
the pleasure of acting in the knowledge that one cannot
know exactly what will come afterwards; and the pleasure
of discovering hidden layers and facets of persons already
in ones acquaintance. The special horror of the idea of
living a fully predictable life in the company of fully
transparent human beings, is the horror of acting without
the possibility of adventure, and of knowing without the
possibility of surprise.
The fact that action is always internally complex
and contradictory, casts a shadow on the rationality of
revolution. Those who rebel may have a clear understanding
of the social relations they are rebelling against, and in
this respect we would want to describe their action as ra-
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tional. But at the same time, and with a special ven-
geance, new barriers arise to their knowing fully what they
are doing. First and most startling, revolution puts an
end to the tacit rules, well-worn habits and routines
which lend a minimal predictability to social life. Al-
though a new set of rules and mores may begin to replace
the old long before open conflict occurs, it still is the
case that people no longer can rely on other people to
act in familiar sorts of ways, for familiar sorts of rea-
sons. Nor can they trust that their own desires, needs
and aims will remain the same comfortable sorts that they
had been, once everything else has changed. Far less than
usual, then, can they be sure of the full meaning, conse-
quences and larger implications of their own action. The
profound uncertainty which thus pervades human action dur-
ing great upheavals, is both the source of the real pro-
mise of revolution, and the strongest argument which pro-
ponents of conservatism have in their favor. Second, and
paradoxically, revolutionaries who seek to destroy the
past, still think and act in ways which are thoroughly
bound up with it. This is inevitable and necessary, given
the fact that neither thought nor action can occur in ab-
straction from an already existent mode of life. But
those defining themselves against a given order of things,
tend to be especially blind to how they are captive of it.
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Hence they often believe that they are acting according to
the dictates of an abstract reason. Lastly, in times of
revolution, the problem of self-disclosure becomes espe-
cially acute. On the one hand, the pressures of conflict
force actors to be explicit about their interests and al-
legiances, and the collapse of traditional mores allows
them to express with spontaneity, new ideas, dreams and
desires. But on the other hand, the very absence of fa-
miliarity and predictability in social relations, and
the high stakes which every decision entails, means that
actors must learn to be very cautious of how they reveal
themselves through their actions to others. This lesson
can be a harsh and sometimes brutal one.
The eventual emergence of new rules, conventions
and stable patterns of interaction, puts an end to such
severe uncertainty in social relations. However, the con-
tradictions which must develop within any social whole,
and the inescapable element of opacity in every action,
always may induce a new break between the self-
understanding of participants and the reality of their
practice. History, in sum, is neither punctuated by tri-
umphs of pure reason in revolution, nor concludes in an
age of perfect rationality and freedom. This does not
mean, of course, that history might not be progressive in
the non-teleological sense of the term. Hegel saw it as
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progressive in this sense (as well as in the other) when
he argued that each new age inherits an increasingly rich
and elaborated past. Marx does the same. While Hegel em-
phasized the accretions which the simple passage of time
adds to art, religion and philosophy, Marx focuses on the
historical development of knowledge about natural and so-
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cial relations. He argues that this development issues
in, among other things, an ever more advanced productive
technology and an ever more complex social organization
of production, which ultimately will provide the material
pre-conditions for the end of economic exploitation. In
strongly anti- teleological statements which belie his own
theory of history, he claims that such pre-conditions
emerge not because the actions of previous generations
"providentially" prepared the way for a future of freedom
and equality, but because "the successive generations
transformed the results acquired by the generations that
preceded them.""*"^^ How a generation transforms what it
acquires, one must emphasize, is an open question. For,
unfortunately, the historical progress of knowledge does
not secure the progress of any other social good.
What, then, are the implications of an internally
complex concept of action for Marx's scientific method?
Certainly, his two most fundamental caveats still hold.
To understand society, one must examine real social prac-
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tice, including the meaninqs which inform it. One also
must abstract from the intricate texture of real practice
to the clarity of its internal structure. But the fact
that any action may become for its author and other ac-
tors, relatively transparent or relatively opaque, in-
validates an explanation of a form of life either solely
in terms of a self-mystifying inner logic, or solely in
terms of the reason of its participants (or, to put it
structurally, in terms of a logic of practice they wholly
determine and understand)
. An account of any society must
proceed on both the level of intersub jective meanings and
the level of inner structure. The disparity between, say,
capitalism and communism, will not be reflected in the
use of two disparate explanatory methods, but rather in
different sets of intersub jective meanings and structures
of social practice; different degrees of "fit" or contra-
diction between the way actors understand their practice
and its objective structure; and different sources of
whatever opacity obtains in social relations. It must be
stressed that because actors never fully and finally com-
prehend, or fully and finally mis-understand, their own
practice, there can never be full correspondence or com-
plete contradiction between an interpretive and structural
account of any social whole. In sum, differences in the
status of intentionality from one society to the next
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always will be differences of degree.
The Marxist tradition has had great faith in the
powers of a materialist science. In conclusion, I would
like to draw attention to a few of its limits. First,
materialist science is a privileged form of knowledge vis
a vis ordinary understanding, to the extent that it probes
the hidden depths of social life. But it is not completely
privileged. We have seen why this is so. Science must
explain society partly in terms of the meanings and beliefs
of its participants, and it is always possible that these
participants will come to a newly acute awareness of what
they are doing. Social science, then, may be uniquely ri-
gorous and systematic, but it is not an entirely separate
enterprise from everyday self -reflection . Second, while a
materialist science may penetrate the reality of past and
present, and may identify the pressures towards dissolu-
tion in a given mode of life, it cannot predict the course
of the future. It cannot do so on the basis of a know-
ledge of universal laws of human behavior, because it
claims that human beings are inherently innovative in their
thought and practices. It cannot do so on the basis of a
knowledge of an historical purpose, plot or idea, because
it claims that categories of consciousness cannot be pre-
dicated of abstractions like "history." Instead, a con-
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sistent materialist theory must conceive of action as,
within concrete limitations, open-ended. That is, it
must conceive of the consequences of action as not deter-
mined in advance of action itself. Third, in that action
is open-ended, the decisions one makes about what to do
in a particular political situation, the intentions with
which one engages in or against a particular set of poli-
tical practices, and those practices themselves, may be
thoughtful of unthinking, scrupulous or devious, revolu-
tionary or reactionary. They cannot be scientific or un-
scientific. We have seen that it is impossible, outside
of an idealist or positivist framework, to speak intel-
ligibly of an "inevitable" socialist future. It is a
similar conceptual mistake to speak of a "scientific"
communist movement or a "scientific" socialism. If one
abandons first the notion that human action expresses an
inherent reason in history, and second the notion that
politics is a field of law-governed human behavior, one
cannot use the categories of "scientific" and "unscien-
tific" with respect to political action at all. With the
obvious exception of theoretical practice itself, such
categories are germaine not to the taking of political
action but rather to the understanding of it. Of course
—
and here he departs from Hegel—Marx firmly believes that
scientific understanding need not come too late to enhance
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the self-knowledge of political actors. But although
persons may act differently once they grasp the full re-
ality of their social life, they act no more scientifically
than they did before. They also may act no more justly
than they did before--not, however, because we cannot speak
intelligibly of politics in this way, but because clear vi-
sion does not guarantee just practice.
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